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Introduction 
Now more than ever, as the world’s nations grow increasingly 
interconnected, much of their security and prosperity has also 
become intertwined. This is why, in considering the larger 
Mediterranean region, it is only to be expected that stability on 
its northern shores is more and more connected with stability 
on its southern shores.
As is well known, the Southern Mediterranean has been a 
region beset by conflict and instability for the best part of a decade. 
Since the so-called Arab Spring, longstanding disputes (the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the challenging political-religious  balance 
in Lebanon, or the fragile Shia-Sunni compromise in Iraq) have 
been coupled by instability in countries that had been somewhat 
stable for much longer such as Syria, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Algeria. Moreover, over the same timespan the Mediterranean 
region has faced a significant number of challenges that have 
stemmed from turbulent events taking place on its southern 
shores: the migration crisis, disruptions of regional value chains, 
souring regional relations, and foreign power interferences that 
have severely affected the region as a whole. 
As though the region’s troubles had not been enough, 
the spread of Covid-19 across the world in general, and the 
Southern Mediterranean in particular, has taken a heavy toll. 
For MENA countries, the global pandemic and its consequences 
have been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the virus 
has exacerbated the unresolved and persistent issues that have 
unfortunately become a regional leitmotiv: political instability, 
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the lack of employment opportunities, the lack of social 
reforms, rising poverty, and underdevelopment in general. 
It has shined a light on the importance of taking action in 
solving these matters before it is too late, while also reminding 
countries that developments in regional neighbours can deeply 
affect their own. On the other hand, as the international health 
crisis became the top priority for most governments in the 
region, it also appears to have overshadowed the importance of 
responding to the very challenges that had been exposed by the 
Covid-19 emergency.
This Report brings together experts and scholars in an effort 
to ponder on possible post-pandemic trends in the Southern 
Mediterranean. The aim is to help readers navigate the future 
of the Southern Mediterranean region, by offering new insights 
and guidance to regional and non-regional governments, civil 
society, and the public at large.
In the first chapter, Ruslan Mamedov retraces how 
geopolitical and security competitions have evolved on the 
Eastern Mediterranean region. Over the last year, the author 
argues, the area has become increasingly important for global 
transport routes and its growing energy potential. Recent energy 
discoveries in the Levant Sea raise the legitimate question: 
which approach will prevail? Will we see cooperation in 
conflict resolution and in promoting collective security, based 
on the joint development of natural gas fields, or is competition 
destined to further complicate the picture for a region already 
fraught with conflicts?
Ivan Bocharov addresses the future of radicalism and 
terrorism in fragile countries – that is, countries struggling 
with weak legitimacy and deteriorating governance settings. 
More specifically, the chapter focuses on Libya by providing 
a comprehensive overview of recent developments within 
the country. The author argues that while the pandemic may 
conceivably have stolen the spotlight from the civil war, and 
shifted the focus of the international community away from 
the terrorism threat, the latter has certainly not disappeared. 
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Rather, by fostering radical sentiments, the socio-economic 
problems resulting from the spread of the virus have created an 
even more fertile ground for recruitment. 
Moving on, Matteo Villa and Elena Corradi examine the 
impact of the pandemic on migration flows between the two 
shores of the Mediterranean, and specifically regular and 
irregular migration from the southern shore towards EU 
countries. By observing the evolution of migration flows in the 
Central Mediterranean route particularly, the authors argue 
that the global health crisis has had the effect of deterring 
regular migration flows to Europe, while leading to an increase 
of irregular migration along some Mediterranean Sea routes.
Chiara Lovotti then deals with post-Covid prospects 
for international cooperation in Lebanon and Syria. Both 
countries were already in a significantly vulnerable position 
before the global pandemic hit. On the one hand, having to 
face a (healthcare) crisis within a (political and social) crisis had 
severe consequences on the Syrian and Lebanese people. On the 
other, it also served as a catalyst for cooperation. In light of the 
urgency of the current situation, the international community 
has largely opted for solidarity and aid over separation and 
disagreements. In such a context, avenues for collaboration, 
although intricate, have multiplied. Convergent economic 
and political interests have acted as a multiplier for potential 
partnerships.  
In the fifth chapter, Andrey Chuprygin examines the 
unfolding developments of the conflict in Libya from the 
perspective of a foreign player: Russia. In a setting similar to 
that of the Syrian civil war the author makes the argument 
that, although the pandemic did negatively affect the Libyan 
population, it was not one of the root causes of the conflict nor 
did it have a considerable impact on the evolution of the pre-
existing crisis. Chuprygin further points out that the primary 
consequence of the pandemic on Libya’s political discourse 
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Finally, Inès Abdel Razek puts the spotlight on Israeli-
Palestinian  relations and highlights the different ways in which 
regional and international trends have impacted respectively the 
Palestinian population and the Palestinian national movement. 
Further, she explores what is at stake in Israeli-Palestinian 
relations and, in particular, what can be lost or gained by both 
parties in the current environment. The author also investigates 
how the current predicament offers an opportunity to review 
the rules of engagement between the two parties, in order to 
reach a negotiated solution. Finally, the chapter looks at the 
way a radical change in the code of conduct of much of the 
international community with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has enabled de facto annexation and ethno-nationalist 
policies to thrive.
In conclusion, the pandemic did wreak havoc on the Southern 
Mediterranean, but the health crisis had somewhat ambiguous 
effects on the underlying economic, social and political  trends of 
the region. Albeit lucky to have a younger population, shielding 
a larger portion of its inhabitants from the worst effects of the 
infection, a war-torn and instability-ravaged region has had to 
deal with “just another” crisis. The pandemic has exposed and 
exacerbated much of the previous sources of tension and, at the 
same time, served to obscure many of them as public attention 
moved towards facing the public health emergency. It remains 
to be seen whether the pandemic will spur governments and 
civil societies into action, or serve as just another smokescreen 
behind which to hide the region’s longstanding problems.
1.  The Energy Sector, Competition and 
     Security in the Eastern Mediterranean
Ruslan Mamedov
Recently, and particularly in 2019-20, scholars have been 
increasingly focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean owing to its 
importance for global transport routes and its growing energy 
potential. The energy sources in the Levant basin raise the 
legitimate question: which approach will prevail? Shall we see 
cooperation in conflict resolution and in promoting collective 
security, based on joint building and development of the fields, 
or shall we see competition destined to exacerbate a situation 
already fraught with conflicts? 
Development of the Fields and Plans  
for Transporting Resources to Global Markets
The Eastern Mediterranean sub-region is at the juncture of 
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, which both makes it 
hostage to old overlapping conflicts and opens up certain 
opportunities. It is important to remember that gas reserves in 
the Mediterranean shelf discovered in the XXI century total 
over 3.8 trillion cubic meters.1 The key fields are Zohr off the 
coast of Egypt, Tamar and Leviathan off the coast of Israel, and 
1 Department of  the Interior, Assessment of  Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of  the 
Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, USGS, Fact Sheet 2010-3014, March 
2010.
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Aphrodite off the coast of Cyprus, etc. Additionally, the so-
called Block 9 is in a part of the field disputed by Lebanon. 
We can suppose there are large gas reserves off the Syrian coast, 
as well. By 2020, development had already been launched 
on several fields but, on the whole, both this process and its 
implementation are proceeding in fits and starts since matters 
have to be approved and agreed between unstable governments 
and oil companies, and also between states themselves, in the 
absence of demarcated maritime borders.
For decades, most states of the Levant Basin have imported 
gas and oil. The Egypt-Israel collaboration in the energy 
sector exhibits a curious dynamic. Currently, these two states 
have made the greatest progress in developing gas fields in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. In 2015, Italy’s Eni discovered 
the gigantic Zohr field in Egypt, a major Arab state, which 
allowed Cairo to break the vicious circle of its dependence 
on imports and to cover its own demand for gas. Egypt now 
produces about 311 million cubic meters of gas and 700,000 
barrels of oil daily (from the deposits in the Western Desert 
adjacent to Libya).2 However, in January 2020, gas production 
also started on Leviathan, the largest field in the Levant Basin 
located on Israel’s stretch of the shelf, and this marked the 
start of deliveries of Leviathan-produced gas to Egypt. Noble 
Energy, which develops Leviathan, contracted to deliver gas to 
Egypt back in 2018. Noble Energy purchased 10% of Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Company, which owns the gas pipeline 
running from Ashkelon in Israel to El-Arish in Egypt (about 90 
km). Even though Egypt has no particular need for gas imports, 
it is striving to create a gas hub. Egypt is planning to receive gas 
from neighbouring states, liquefy it at the Egyptian LNG plant 
(Idku LNG with a capacity of 7.2 m. tonnes a year), and sell 
it on global markets, sending it by tanker to Europe or Asia.3
2 Дайджест событий мирового нефтегазового рынка (Digest of  events on the 
global oil and gas market) 21-25 September 2020
3 “Левиафан поплыл. На проблемном израильском месторождении 
началась добыча газа” (“The Leviathan swam. Gas production starts at 
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Egypt’s interests have taken this turn since it has had fewer 
problems developing and selling its own natural gas, while the 
situation is somewhat more complicated for Israel. Development 
of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields has slowed down owing 
to the technically challenging gas production process, the high 
market price of the gas (which makes it difficult to find buyers), 
and domestic political and regional instability stemming from 
maritime border demarcation issues. 
To settle matters related to the above-mentioned Block 
9, Israel engaged in talks with Lebanon on demarcating the 
maritime border, a historic event in the two states’ bilateral 
relations. Lebanese officials made every effort to emphasize that 
these talks were purely technical. International companies are 
certainly interested in the success of these negotiations; the Total-
Eni-Novatek consortium has signed a contract for exploration in 
Block 9. Despite claims that their talks are exclusively technical, 
both Israel and Lebanon need these negotiations. For Israel, 
they will mark another success in gaining regional recognition 
of its rights while, should development of the gas fields prove 
successful, they will afford Lebanon a special opportunity to 
attract additional investment. The gas produced could come 
in handy for both domestic consumption and exports, which 
together would constitute an important boost to the crisis-
stricken Lebanese economy.4
Transporting the gas to Europe demanded that Cyprus be 
involved. This once again raised the predictable issue of Cyprus 
and prompted a response from Turkey (which we believe to be 
somewhat belated). In the course of time, Israel succeeded in 
securing the support of Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. The latter 
two states need to be involved for two reasons: the Aphrodite 
deposit was discovered off the coast of Cyprus and there is also 
the matter of transporting the Levantine natural gas to Europe. 
This question has produced the principal frictions concerning 
problem Israeli field”), Neftegaz.ru, 17 January 2020.
4 “Gas is the engine of  progress Israel and Lebanon begin talks on demarcation 
of  maritime border”, Kommersant, 14 October 2020.
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the Eastern Mediterranean. The plans to build a pipeline to 
Europe have not been implemented yet; however, on 2 January 
2020, Greece, Cyprus and Israel signed a treaty to construct the 
1,900-kilometre EastMed gas pipeline. This question is claimed 
to be of interest to both Europe and the U.S. as mitigating 
the risks of dependence on Russian gas (see below for further 
details). Construction of the gas pipeline with a capacity of 10 
billion cubic metres a year is expected to take approximately 
seven years. 
Revitalisation of Ankara’s foreign policy and  
regional competition in the Eastern Mediterranean
While other states in the Eastern Mediterranean (Israel, Egypt, 
Cyprus, Greece and, to some extent, Lebanon) have attempted 
to form alliances around the energy sector and gas exports, 
Turkey has remained on the sidelines. Nevertheless, both the 
regional reconfiguration and the domestic perturbations that 
affected Turkey in 2016 after the attempted military coup 
resulted in Ankara taking more active political steps and shaping 
its own policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Before 2016, 
Turkey strove to apply the “strategic depth” concept formulated 
in the 2000s by the state’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoglu. Following his resignation in May 2016, and 
particularly after the attempted military coup, Ankara began to 
steer a course toward developing a new strategy and becoming 
actively involved in its neighbours’ affairs. 
As a result, Turkey began to drift away from the “strategic depth” 
concept and toward a policy that is more independent of its 
traditional partners and also favours tactically advantageous 
cooperation and going back to using “hard power” … Back in 
2006, Turkish Admiral Cem Gürdeniz introduced the “Blue 
Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) doctrine as part of Turkey’s maritime 
strategy; Gürdeniz is considered to be one of the principal 
architects of Turkey’s current policy in the Mediterranean and of 
the ideology of demarcating the borders with Libya.5
5 N. Kulijeva, From “strategic depth” to “blue homeland”: New Turkish policy in the 
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The agreements Turkey and the Libyan government concluded 
in late 2019 resulted from a bilateral Ankara-Tripoli arrangement 
achieved with complete disregard for other actors and for the 
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since Turkey is not a 
signatory to that Convention, Ankara believes it had the right 
to shape its own bilateral relations, which also implies larger 
sea spaces for Turkey. Sooner or later, this approach by Turkey 
will inevitably come up against growing discontent on the 
part of other states. In this respect, much depends on whether 
Turkey will make concessions and cut a deal to retain some 
benefits, or whether it will risk escalating tensions, sanctions 
and serious economic problems. Turkey’s revitalised policy 
is reaching its limits. In fact, this policy, pursued as part of 
Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine, stems from Ankara’s own 
missed opportunities. We can expect Turkey’s revitalised policy 
in the “post-Ottoman” space to peak in late 2020 in the face of 
the discontent of other actors. It is now crucially important for 
Turkey to reach a regional consensus with the other states of the 
Eastern Mediterranean.
The Eastern Mediterranean sub-region has laid bare rifts in 
adjacent regions: Europe and the Middle East. As far the European 
dimension is concerned, we are observing a rapprochement 
between Italy and Turkey while France is building up its military 
presence in the sub-region and countering Turkey’s objectives. 
As far as the Middle East is concerned, strife and regional 
competition are building up between Qatar and Turkey on the 
one hand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt on the other. The establishment of relations between 
the UAE and Israel might also entail additional risks for Eastern 
Mediterranean stability, since the two states’ interests are 
currently rather convergent and contrary to Ankara’s ambitions 
in the sub-region. Both Israel and the UAE have a high degree 
of confidence in Washington and their lobbying potential there. 
This could deliver a powerful blow to U.S.-Turkey relations, 
Eastern Mediterranean, Russian Council on Foreign Affairs, 13 August 2020.
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already severely tested in connection with the Syrian Kurds and 
Fethullah Gülen, the Turkish preacher accused of instigating 
the 2016 attempted military coup in Turkey.
In these circumstances, the rift within NATO takes on a 
different hue. So far, truly dangerous developments between 
France and Turkey, locked in a conflict in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, have been prevented by NATO having 
“arbitrators” in the U.S. and Germany. Nevertheless, it appears 
that joint efforts by NATO’s key members and Russia could 
create opportunities to develop mechanisms for preventing 
the situation from deteriorating further and tensions from 
escalating.
Old resolved conflicts in the sub-region overlap with both 
revived and new problems. For instance, provided local actors 
adopt an appropriate approach and external actors focus 
their attention on the sub-region, the energy sector could 
form the basis for a future regional security architecture; 
currently, however, these matters are only exacerbating the 
regional predicament. As they overlap with the traditional 
Israeli-Palestinian, Greek-Turkish and Cyprus questions, 
these developments are encouraging escalation and further 
competition. 
The Global Dimension: The U.S. and Russia 
in the Eastern Mediterranean
A competitive foundation for international relations is 
currently solidifying in the Eastern Mediterranean. There are 
no expectations of a cooperative approach, since one party or 
another will always have greater ambitions and will attempt to 
implement exclusion policies. Russia and the U.S. are the key 
external actors interested in the region’s stability, so it would be 
expedient for them to work out joint crisis-prevention solutions. 
For the U.S., Israel’s security and an Israeli-Palestine 
settlement, as well as support for NATO’s infrastructure and 
bodies, remain the key issues in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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The latter is particularly important for Americans because they 
view the Eastern Mediterranean as NATO’s naval gateway to 
the Black Sea. This approach by the U.S. is destructive for other 
actors globally and for those directly involved in security issues 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. Given the serious risks and the 
fact that the situation could get out of hand, the U.S. have 
therefore been prompted to recognise, at least at expert level, 
the need to work on technical deconfliction measures in this 
part of the world. This requires finding a way to untangle the 
Cyprus, Libya and Syria questions.
As for Russia’s policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, we should 
recall Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visited 
Damascus and Cyprus in 2020. Mr. Lavrov emphasised that 
escalation was inadmissible and called for peaceful resolution of 
the contradictions through dialogue. Bilateral and multilateral 
dialogue, UN mechanisms, and international law should bring 
the parties to de-escalate tensions. Russia’s Foreign Minister 
also said Moscow was ready to act as a mediator should it be 
necessary. Russia is particularly concerned about the Syrian 
and Libyan part of the Eastern Mediterranean since Russia has 
maintained a military presence in Syria since 2015. By 2020, 
the world had seen the violence in the Syrian crisis abating 
but, in 2019-20, both Lebanon and Syria’s economic situation 
deteriorated steadily and man-made disasters and large-scale 
wildfires occurred. People’s lives and the overall humanitarian 
situation were badly affected by the political elites’ inability 
to settle the crises and by European and American sanctions. 
Syria and Lebanon’s markets and currencies fell when the U.S. 
Congress adopted the so-called Caesar Act, a set of sanctions 
against Syria, and individual sanctions against Lebanon. 
Moscow, Washington and Damascus need to launch a serious 
political dialogue (not only at the level of the secret services) 
concerning the situation surrounding Lebanon and Syria. 
Further deterioration is fraught with new risks, especially for 
the neighbours of the two countries.
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With no “honest broker” available in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the risks of new regional clashes and problems 
increase. Some states practice a “bloc-based” approach to 
developing the fields and transporting gas; there are long-
standing conflicts (the Cyprus question, the Palestinian 
question); there are no diplomatic contacts between individual 
regional actors (for instance, between Turkey and Egypt, 
between Turkey and Syria); all these factors exacerbate mistrust 
and undermine regional security. The Eastern Mediterranean 
states are committed to resolving economic interaction issues 
through dialogue provided there are one or more independent 
actors capable of taking various interests into account and 
finding solutions. Such a development would create an avenue 
for building confidence and could even result in collective 
security elements. (The European Coal and Steel Community 
played a role in the emergence of the OSCE, so a gas community 
in the Eastern Mediterranean could advance sub-regional 
integration and security). Given the U.S.’ interest in the region 
and the role it plays there, this issue could be put on the Russia-
U.S. bilateral agenda with a view to achieving the most secure, 
acceptable and inclusive result. 
2.  The Future of Radicalism and 
     Terrorism in Fragile States 
 Ivan Bocharov
The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, a Doha-based 
research centre, publishes the Arab Opinion Index annually. In 
2020, the new study was published. Researchers at the centre 
conducted 28,288 interviews with respondents from the whole 
Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, 
Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Algeria, and Mauritania.1 In 2019-20, the Arab Opinion Index 
showed the view of ISIS and other similar extremist groups is 
mostly negative. However, 3% of Arabs have a very positive 
view of such groups, and 2% have a somewhat positive view 
of ISIS and other similar organisations (in the 2017-18, it was 
2% and 3%). Comparing the results with those of previous 
years shows the situation has largely remained stable overall. 
However, according to the study, the percentage of people 
who have a very positive view of ISIS is the highest since 2014 
and the same as in 2015. The portion of Arabs who have a 
negative attitude towards ISIS increased to 10% (7% in 2017-
18), while the percentage of people with an extremely negative 
view dropped to 78% (85% in 2017-18).2 This statistic is 
quite frightening and leads to the conclusion the problems of 
radicalisation in society and terrorism need far more attention.
1 The 2019-20 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Arab Center for Research 
and Political Studies, p. 1. 
2 Ibid., p. 58.
The Future of Radicalism and Terrorism in Fragile States 21
Not only Mediterranean countries, but the whole world 
closely followed the growing radical trends in North Africa 
following the Arab Spring. The Covid-19 pandemic has shifted 
the focus of the global community towards solving its health 
problems. At the same time, the terrorist threat in fragile 
Southern Mediterranean countries has not disappeared or even 
become frozen. On the contrary, socioeconomic problems have 
created additional space for the growth of radical sentiment. 
Below is a brief overview of the status of radicalism and 
terrorism in North African countries in order to understand 
the threats that exist in some of these states.
Libyan Terrorist Threat and 
Its Impact on the Region
The main source of destabilisation in the Southern 
Mediterranean is Libya, where the war has not stopped since 
February 2011. After the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, a 
security vacuum emerged in the country, which was eventually 
filled by terrorists from the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-
Sharia, and other jihadist groups. Today’s chaos in Libya creates 
ideal conditions for terrorism to flourish. Libya is now divided 
into 2 large parts, which are controlled by the Government 
of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army 
(LNA), as well as several small areas that are not controlled by 
either side of the Libyan conflict. There are no unified state 
structures in the country; there are many weapons and plenty 
of military equipment. Added to this is Libya’s geostrategic 
position, as well as access to hydrocarbon production, which is 
also an advantage for terrorists.
The influence of the Libyan threat extends to neighbouring 
countries and contributes to the radicalisation of North Africa. 
For example, the negative role played by Libyan terrorists in 
protecting Egypt’s national security is obvious. First, weapons 
and explosives get from Libya to Egypt. In 2015-17, Egyptian 
troops destroyed more than 1,200 trucks with weapons and 
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explosives that were en route to Egypt from Libya.3 Secondly, 
militants can be trained in Libya and then transported to a 
neighbouring country via the poorly controlled Egyptian-
Libyan border. In 2017, the Egyptian air force was even forced 
to launch airstrikes on the jihadist strongholds in Derna as 
they were involved in preparing a terrorist attack on Egyptian 
territory.4
Tunisia once faced a similar problem. In March 2016, 
Islamic State militants, who were training near the Libyan 
city of Sabratha, invaded Tunisia and battled with Tunisian 
security forces for several days.5 It is also noteworthy that the 
perpetrators of the major terrorist attacks in Tunisia in 2015 
were Tunisians who were trained in Islamic State camps near 
Sabratha.6 The Pentagon, in cooperation with Germany, even 
had to send financial aid to Tunisia to at least partially secure 
Tunisia’s border with Libya.7
Despite calls for a ceasefire, fighting continues in Libya. 
The global crisis caused by the pandemic has filled the global 
information space and the Libyan conflict has almost been 
forgotten. At the same time, in June 2020, there was another 
exacerbation in the military conflict, when the troops of the 
GNA tried to counterattack against the LNA.
Notably, the problem of radicalisation in Libyan society and 
the issue of terrorism in this country cannot be solved without 
ending the war and creating unified state institutions of power 
3 A. Megahid, “Egypt pinning hopes on new reconnaissance satellite to help 
military with border controls”, The Arab Weekly, 2 Sptember 2018. 
4 A.H. Ashraf  Egypt participates“)  ةنرد ىلع تاراغلا يف رصم كراشت ايبيل 
in the raids on Derna”), Al Arabiya, 27 May 2017. 
5 F. Wehrey. مُسرت نأ ةّيبيّللا ةّينمألا تاّيدحتلل فيك :ةوحّصلل ٌةوعد ،سنوت 
 Tunisia’s Wake-Up Call: How) ؟ةّيسنوتلا ةّينطولا عافدلا ةسّسؤُمل ةّيحالصإ رداوب
Security Challenges From Libya Are Shaping Defense Reforms), Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. 19 August 2020.
6 C. Stephen, “Tunisia gunman trained in Libya at same time as Bardo museum 
attackers”, The Guardian, 30 June 2015. 
7 J. Detsch, “Pentagon partners with Germany on Tunisia border security”, Al-
Monitor, 23 February 2018. 
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that do not fight each other. It is very difficult to concentrate 
on the fight against ISIS fighters when the leaders of the GNA 
and LNA mutually accuse each other of terrorism. Nonetheless, 
there have still been some successes in the fight against jihadists. 
For example, in September 2020, in Southern Libya, LNA 
forces killed the leader of the Islamic State in North Africa.8
The conflict persists. Until now, the political ambitions of 
the opposing sides have prevailed over the desire to protect the 
population from radicals. Post-pandemic trends in terrorism 
not only in Libya but also in fragile, neighbouring Southern 
Mediterranean countries depend directly on the prospects 
of a political settlement for the war. The establishment of a 
ceasefire between GNA and LNA, as well as the development 
of mechanisms for uniting the country together with the 
establishment of unified institutions of power, could be the 
first and most important steps in combating the terrorist threat 
in the region. The relevant parties will be able to unite their 
efforts in the fight against jihadists, and only in such a scenario 
will it be appropriate to talk about programmes for the de-
radicalisation of militants and about using a combination of 
hard and soft measures with radicals. 
In all likelihood, in an environment where the world 
community is focused on solving the problems caused by 
the pandemic, the chances of political peace in Libya are 
diminishing. This means significant progress in the fight 
against Libyan terrorists is unlikely. 2020 is not over yet, but it 
is already possible to surmise the situation with radicalisation 
and terrorism has worsened. Libya continues to be a fertile 
ground for militants from across the region and will remain 
the main terrorist hotbed in the Southern Mediterranean in 
the medium term.
8 Ливийская армия ликвидировала главаря ИГ в Северной Африке (“Libyan 
army eliminates IS leader in North Africa”), TASS, 23 September 2020. 
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The global community should make every effort to ensure 
the warring parties reach an agreement as soon as possible on 
the formation of a unified transitional government and then 
organise elections. It is extremely important to strictly suppress 
violations of the embargo (including by Turkey). The more 
weapons that get into Libya, the longer the terrorist threat will 
remain.
Egyptian Powder Keg
The problem of terrorism is one of the key security challenges 
in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi once even said that Egypt’s two main problems are 
terrorism and rapid population growth.9 The post-pandemic 
trends of radicalism and terrorism in Egypt are the most 
unpredictable and could have dire consequences.
The most dangerous and powerful terrorist organisation 
operating in Egypt is the Wilayat Sinai of the Islamic State. 
Originally known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, this Salafi jihadist 
group began operations in 2011 following the overthrow of 
President Hosni Mubarak. After the removal of the government 
of Mohammed Morsi in 2013, the group began to actively 
act against the Egyptian security forces, and in 2014 swore 
allegiance to the Islamic State.10 The Islamic State carries out the 
vast majority of terrorist attacks in Egypt, including blowing up 
a Russian passenger plane in October 2015.
The Sinai Peninsula is full of Egyptian armed forces, which 
have been conducting counter-terrorism operations against 
ISIS over the past few years. Nevertheless, the terrorist group 
cannot be defeated. The Egyptian military manages to contain 
the terrorist threat to some extent, but there are no real signs 
9 E. Krutikov. Высокая рождаемость разоряет Египет (“High fertility ravages 
Egypt”), Vzglyad, 19 October 2017. 
10 Islamic State - Sinai Province, The Center for International Security and 
Cooperation. 
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of significant changes in this threat. In 2020, the Sinai cell of 
ISIS committed more than a hundred terrorist attacks, which 
were aimed, among other things, at armoured military vehicles, 
military construction vehicles, and a gas pipeline.11
Unfortunately, the Islamic State is not the only group 
operating in Egypt. Recently, Ajnad Misr (“Soldiers of Egypt”), 
a Salafi terrorist group, has become quite famous. It is now 
one of the most active jihadist groups in Egypt. It has been 
operating around Cairo since 2013 and has committed terrible 
terrorist attacks, including the assassination of Brigadier 
General Ahmed Zaki in April 2014. A distinctive feature of 
the group is targeted attacks against state structures. Ajnad 
Misr tries to avoid civilian casualties and treats women very 
well. The terrorist organisation partially justifies its activities 
by protecting women from the arbitrary rule of the State, in 
particular from the brutal suppression of peaceful protests.12
The group’s concern about the lives of civilians and the 
safety of women leads to two compelling assumptions. First, 
Ajnad Misr is a less radical group than Al-Qaeda or the Islamic 
State. De-radicalisation programmes directed against this 
Salafi group may be far more successful than those targeting 
some others. Secondly, the de-radicalisation of its members 
can occur by adopting a more humane attitude towards the 
civilian population. Egyptian security forces may choose not to 
brutally crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, and deal with 
the disaffected part of society peacefully. It is logical to assume 
the peaceful existence of the rule of law can win the sympathy 
of the rank-and-file members of Ajnad Misr, which in the long 
term may contribute to their de-radicalisation.
One of the four postulates that President al-Sisi has set out 
for the fight against terrorism is “Fight all forms of terror”, 
that is, “confronting all terrorist organisations without 
11 A. McManus, ISIS in the Sinai: A Persistent Threat for Egypt, Center for Global 
Policy, 23 June 2020. 
12 Ajnad Misr, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), 22 July 2014. 
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discrimination”.13 However, there is an increase in repression 
against civilians, which spins the process of radicalisation.
The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) 
conducted opinion polls into how Egyptians viewed the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the degree of their recognition on the 
political scene after the 30 June Revolution and the resignation 
of former President Mohamed Morsi. The survey results showed 
69% of Egyptians rejected the continued involvement of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian life, while 6% agreed with 
it continuing activities, and 13% agreed with it  continuing 
activities, but with reservations (for example, to be a missionary 
organisation, not a political one).14 This is a rather large portion 
of society, whose opinion must be taken into account. And 6% 
of the population should not be classified as terrorists for their 
solidarity with the renewed political activity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
However, between July 2013 and May 2014, Egyptian 
security forces detained, indicted, or sentenced at least 41,000 
people, leading to tensions in prisons. Torture was often used 
against detainees.15 The current and alleged political opponents 
of the new Egyptian authorities faced unlawful detentions, 
disappearances, and murders. In prisons, they were treated 
extremely cruelly, including physical and sexual torture.16 
Prisoners are subjected to severe psychological pressure due to 
extremely poor conditions. Prison authorities often send young 
prisoners to radical cells, where young people are exposed 
to inmates.17 This created an environment that generally 
13 “Egypt and the United States: Collaborating to Fight Terrorism”, Embassy 
of  Egypt.
Egyptian evaluation of) نيملسملا ناوخإلا ةعامجل نييرصملا مييقت 14  the Muslim 
Brotherhood), The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera), 
27August 2013. 
Egypt: Year of“) يسيسلا ةدايق لظ يف تاكاهتنالا نم ماع ـ رصم 15  Abuses 
Under al-Sisi”), Human Rights Watch, 8 June 2015. 
16 Regime Repression and Youth Radicalization in Egypt, Policy Brief  Egypt 2 – 
Radicalization, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2017, p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
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encouraged young people in Egypt to embrace extremist ideas.
The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted Egypt’s 
socioeconomic instability and hit the Egyptian economy hard. 
In the Arab Republic of Egypt, cinemas, theatres and zoos were 
temporarily closed. Due to the Covid-19 epidemic, the opening 
of New Cairo, the Grand Egyptian Museum, and other major 
projects were postponed until 2021. But most importantly, 
international air traffic was suspended. Resorts soon began to 
close. All this could not but affect the tourism industry and the 
economy as a whole. In March 2020, Egypt’s foreign exchange 
reserves were reduced by US$5 billion.18 The Egyptian stock 
market (EGX) collapsed, recording the largest drop of any 
Arab stock market, and lost 95 billion Egyptian pounds (about 
US$5.5 billion).19
The situation is aggravated by the demographic crisis. In 
February 2020, it was announced the population of Egypt 
had crossed the 100 million mark.20 In a matter of decades, 
the population of Egypt has increased significantly, while 
the country’s opportunities for agricultural development are 
extremely limited. Given the rapidly growing population of 
Egypt, it can be assumed the State will soon not have enough 
water resources, which are so necessary for the functioning of 
the country’s irrigation system. 
Thus, a dangerous situation similar to a powder keg arises 
in Egypt. The state is threatened by a severe economic crisis 
that will have long-term consequences. And in socioeconomic 
terms, the situation in Egypt is now more difficult than on 
the eve of the Arab Spring in 2011. It is common knowledge 
this led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak and the 
18 Валютные резервы Египта сократились на $5 миллиардов из-за COVID-19 
(“Egypt’s foreign exchange reserves drop $ 5 billion due to COVID-19”), РИА 
Новости, 8 April 2020. 
 Egyptian Stock Exchange Lost“) ةصروبلا ةيرصملا رسخت 95 رايلم هينج يف عوبسأ 19
£95bn in a Week”), Youm7, 19 March 2020. 
 .. million live in Cairo 10“) 10 نييالم نونكسي ةرهاقلا .. دادعتو رصم 100 نويلم ةمسن 20
Egypt’s population has exceeded 100 million”), Alhurra, 11 February 2020. 
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coming to power of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the 
radicalisation of society now has more weighty reasons, caused 
by the growth of the terrorist threat from the Sinai cell of ISIS, 
Ajnad Misr, and other jihadist groups. An important role is 
also played by the anger of people caused by often baseless 
repression by the State. This means that, in the short term, an 
uncontrolled social explosion may occur in Egypt, which may 
result in a sharp increase in the influence of terrorist groups or 
even the overthrow of the current government.
In some ways, Egypt is taking effective measures to combat 
terrorists. For example, the military called on the residents 
of Sinai, frustrated by the presence of militants, to provide 
intelligence. Besides, the army formed small militias that could 
independently resist the jihadists.21 In 2019, the Ministry of 
Awqaf opened an academy to train imams and preachers to 
counter “extremist narratives”, and Al-Azhar University has 
presented several new academic books on the relationship 
between Muslims and Christians and the promotion of equality 
between the two religions.22
To keep things under control, it is imperative to be proactive. 
First, the Egyptian authorities should immediately end the 
persecution of tens of thousands of Egyptians for political 
reasons. It should be understood the arrests of innocent people 
could lead to people falling under the influence of radicals, 
of whom there are many in prisons. This is the most obvious 
form of radicalisation in Egyptian society and it is created 
by the authorities themselves. Secondly, it is necessary to 
rely more on soft measures for ordinary members of radical 
organisations, in particular Ajnad Misr. Indeed, not violently 
suppressing peaceful demonstrations might prove very effective 
in persuading rank-and-file Ajnad Misr members to abandon 
the violent struggle and opposition. Thirdly, Egypt today more 
than ever needs humanitarian assistance and direct financial 
21 A. McManus (2020). 
22 Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt, U.S. Department of  State. 
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support. In the current difficult conditions, in addition to 
food, humanitarian aid may contain Covid-19 tests, which 
Egypt lacks. It is also necessary to develop a mechanism for 
controlling the demographic situation in the country, that is, 
to control population growth so as not to cause famine in the 
country.
In the era of the coronavirus pandemic, global and regional 
players are focused on solving their problems, and this is 
natural. But now the world powers should pay more attention 
to Egypt as a potential new hotbed of activity for jihadists and 
other radical elements capable of seriously destabilising the 
situation in the Middle East and North Africa. This could have 
very negative consequences.
Prospects for Radicalisation of Protests in Tunisia
The future of radicalism and terrorism in Tunisia does not seem 
as pessimistic as it is in Egypt. Nevertheless, there are certain 
risks with specific roots. In Tunisia, regional inequality plays 
a special role. This problem is inherent in many states in the 
Middle East and North Africa, for example, Egypt or Algeria. 
However, a unique situation has developed in Tunisia.
The Eastern regions of Tunisia are traditionally poor. Since 
the 1970s, the Tunisian government has directed money 
towards the development of coastal areas, developing tourism 
and industry there. At the same time, remote parts of Tunisia, 
especially its Eastern regions, were only sources of cheap 
labour. According to 2014 World Bank data, half of Tunisia’s 
population and 85% of the country’s GDP is concentrated near 
Tunisia, Sfax, and Sousse, the country’s three largest cities.23
High levels of poverty have forced easterners to engage in the 
smuggling trade with Libya, often the only way to make a living. 
23 H. Meddeb, دوعصو ةيوهجلا تاتوافتلا :سنوت يف بضغلا ةيفارغج 
Tunisia’s Geography of) ةيوبعشلا  Anger: Regional Inequalities and the Rise of  Populism), 
Carnegie Middle East Center, 3 March 2020. 
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At the same time, the Tunisian authorities have taken measures 
to secure the border with Libya, to strengthen control over it, 
which made it even more difficult for the smugglers. This has 
led to an increase in corruption among customs officers and 
border guards. Besides, the smuggling of alcohol, drugs, and 
weapons began to flourish.24 The militarisation of the Tunisian-
Libyan border has backfired, creating more opportunities for 
corruption and trafficking in illegal goods instead of curbing 
crime.
The spread of the coronavirus has not spared Tunisia. The 
Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted agriculture and agribusiness 
activities in the Tunisian market. The supply of fruit was 
also negatively impacted by isolation and social distancing 
measures. Restrictions on the movement of fruit farmworkers 
have dramatically reduced the supply of fruit to local markets.25
Among the industry, textiles and clothing and the mechanical 
and electrical industries have been severely affected. In the 
industrial sector of Tunisia, business has decreased and the fall 
in demand for products increased. The pandemic has caused 
significant economic damage to the tourism industry.26 The 
transport sector, construction, and several other spheres of the 
Tunisian economy have also suffered. The volume of foreign 
trade decreased, primarily with China, France, Germany, and 
Italy.27
The level of the terrorist threat in Tunisia is relatively low, but 
another reason might cause the destabilisation of the situation. 
The uneven economic development of the regions increases the 
level of social tension. In the interior of the country, sit-ins, 
24 A. Boukhars, The Potential Jihadi Windfall From the Militarization of  Tunisia’s Border 
Region With Libya, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 March 2020. 
25 Z. ElKadhi, D. Elsabbagh, A. Frija, T. Lakoud, M. Wiebelt, and C. Breisinger, 
The Impact of  COVID-19 on Tunisia’s Economy, Agri-food System, and Households, 
Regional Program Policy Note 05, International Food Policy Research Institute. 
May 2020, p. 3.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 4.
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road closures, and other attempts by representatives of the 
provinces to put pressure on the central authorities often take 
place. The coronavirus pandemic has laid the foundation for a 
global recession, and there is no reason to believe the slowdown 
in economic growth will bypass Tunisia. This means that soon, 
the trend towards the economic differentiation of individual 
Tunisian regions may increase. This could lead to an increase 
in protests in Tunisia, especially in the eastern part of the state.
To keep the terrorist threat relatively low and prevent a surge 
in revolutionary sentiment, the economic development of 
the Eastern regions of Tunisia has to be tackled seriously. The 
government should try to evenly distribute economic benefits 
and expand social programmes for poor people. Foreign powers 
can make targeted investments in the east of Tunisia. Together, 
it is necessary to achieve the goal of creating new jobs, so that 
Tunisians can work legally, and not be involved in smuggling, 
especially of prohibited items (drugs, arms). Should the 
economic situation deteriorate further in the Eastern regions, 
mass protests are possible and could be radical. If smugglers 
continue to trade in weapons, local markets will very soon 
become flooded with these. In North Africa, hypothetically, 
another hotbed of destabilisation may arise.
The Situation in Algeria
It seems Algeria has taken heed of its experience of fighting 
extremists in the 1990s. Algeria has taken an integrated approach 
in countering terrorists, combining hard military measures 
with soft power and economic reforms, and now Salafi groups 
(Armed Islamic Group (GIA); Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat (GSPC)) have practically no influence in Algeria. 
The government took measures such as amnesty for jihadists 
who surrendered their weapons at the end of the civil war in 
2006. Large-scale rehabilitation programmes for prisoners were 
launched. Algeria also closely monitored religious institutions 
and did not admit radical Islamists.
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The Algerian government is actively promoting programmes 
for the rehabilitation of repentant terrorists and their 
integration into normal society. Besides, control is exercised to 
ensure extremist narratives are not disseminated in mosques. In 
particular, in Algeria, it is prohibited to hold public meetings 
outside of prayer times.28
However, on the eve of the active phase of the spread of 
Covid-19 in North Africa, Algeria was going through hard times. 
The country was gripped by protests as people began to trust 
the government less. People refused to leave the streets despite 
demands to maintain safe healthcare distances. Demonstrators 
believed the authorities’ requests to stay at home were motivated 
not by concerns about the safety of the protesters, but by the 
fact staying home would cause the protests to subside.29
In March 2020, the failure of the OPEC+ deal caused a 
sharp drop in oil prices. The oil price reached a historic low 
of US$19.46 per barrel. Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves are 
severely depleted.30 Algeria, rich in hydrocarbons, is highly 
dependent on fluctuations in oil prices. Approximately 95% of 
Algeria’s export revenues come from the sale of hydrocarbons. 
In the context of new economic development, the Algerian 
government launched a cost optimisation process, in connection 
with which the country’s budget was reduced, first by 30%, 
and then by 50%.31 Added to this is the negative impact of 
the Covid-19 pandemic, which has triggered a new economic 
crisis, coupled with the oil crash.
Economic growth is expected to slow down at least in the 
coming months, leading to an increase in the already high 
unemployment rate. The deterioration of the socioeconomic 
situation could increase the willingness to protest. The situation 
28 Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Algeria, U.S. Department of  State, 2019. 
29 D. Ghanem, Coronavirus in Algeria: Change may have to wait, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 8 April 2020. 
30 Ibid.
31 D. Ghanem, Algeria: Toward an economic collapse?, Middle East Institute, 26 May 
2020. 
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is especially dangerous because such social tensions were quite 
high even before the pandemic. A situation may arise when the 
mood crosses the red line. In theory, this could result in mass 
demonstrations, including radical ones. At the same time, the 
situation in Algeria is quite stable compared to Egypt, or even 
Tunisia. However, in the absence of clear economic success, the 
situation in Algeria could become destabilised. The government 
should find new financial opportunities to transform the 
structure of the Algerian economy.
Positive Experience of Morocco
Morocco is one of the most stable states in the Southern 
Mediterranean. Over the past several years, security forces have 
successfully prevented terrorist attacks. The state has focused 
on strengthening security services and eliminating terrorist 
cells. The Moroccan armed forces were deployed in places 
where a terrorist attack could theoretically occur (airports, train 
stations), and the security services actively cooperated with 
informants in terrorist cells and concentrated their efforts on 
intelligence. In total, in the period from 2011 to 2017, 97 cells 
were liquidated, 44 of which had a direct connection to the 
Islamic State.32 Morocco now prioritises religious oversight. In 
particular, a programme was prepared to train imams to oppose 
radical ideas. Besides, a lot of work is being carried out with 
young people and specially trained people talk to them on 
religious and social topics.33
The coronavirus crisis has hit Morocco’s economy hard. More 
than 100,000 Moroccan companies have stopped working, 
hundreds of thousands of people have lost their jobs.34 At the 
32 “Dealing with Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Insights from the 
Moroccan Experience”, European Eye on Radicalization, 25 March 2020. 
33 Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Morocco, U.S. Department of  State, 2019.
 Coronavirus in) ةيعامتجالاو ةيداصتقالا تاعِبّتلا :برغملا يف انوروك سوريف 34
Morocco: Economic and Social Implications), The Washington Institute, 23 April 2020. 
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same time, Morocco’s economy is not as heavily dependent on 
tourism (as Egypt) and on energy exports (as Algeria), so the 
crisis did not plunge the economy into the same state of shock 
as other North African countries. In general, there is no reason 
to assume a sharp aggravation or destabilisation caused by a 
terrorist threat or radicalisation in the short term.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In any state, there is a direct link between socioeconomic 
development and protest, sometimes even radical sentiments 
in society. The economic crisis triggered by the Covid-19 
pandemic is bound to increase social tensions in the fragile 
countries of the Southern Mediterranean. The intrigue is which 
countries will be able to maintain control over the situation, 
and in which radical elements will be able to take advantage of 
how things stand and destabilise the region.
The pandemic did not overshadow ongoing conflicts and 
political instability, but it did exacerbate existing contradictions. 
Even if the grave consequences of the coronavirus crisis do 
not manifest themselves in the next 1 or 2 years, they may 
appear further down the line. The problems that have arisen in 
connection with the coronavirus are a time bomb, which might 
also destabilise the situation in the region in the near future.
Over the past 10 years, the main focus of terrorist 
destabilisation has been Libya, a situation which negatively 
affects its neighbours (primarily Egypt and Tunisia). 
International powers should focus on swiftly finding a settlement 
for the Libyan conflict, as this could provoke radical trends in 
Egypt and Tunisia. The situation is especially dangerous and 
unpredictable in Egypt, which over the past years has been 
fighting terrorists with varying success, but has not been able 
to completely solve the problem. The international community 
should consider the possibility of at least sending large-scale 
humanitarian aid, primarily food, to Egypt and other fragile 
countries in the Southern Mediterranean.
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Yet, a revival of the Islamic State similar to 2014 is unlikely 
since there was a political vacuum in Syria and Iraq at that time. 
It is this vacuum that has been filled by jihadists. The current 
situation in North Africa is different, but it remains dangerous. 
In the future, an increase in the number of terrorist attacks 
and the radicalisation of protest sentiment in fragile states is 
possible. It is necessary to prepare for these processes. All North 
African countries should combine forceful measures with soft 
measures and economic reforms. In many ways, it is economic 
differentiation and stagnation that are the causes of social 
discontent, the growth of protest sentiment, and the emergence 
of radical trends in society. Investments should be directed, 
among other things, to the development of unstable regions 
(Sinai, and Eastern regions of Tunisia) so the local population 
has less motivation to resist the authorities and security forces.
It is necessary to secure the border with Libya as much as 
possible. It is known that the United States helps Tunisia to 
control the border with Libya. At the same time, the border 
with other countries (especially with Egypt) remains poorly 
protected. Southern Mediterranean states should look to the 
Moroccan counter-terrorism experience of deploying troops 
at airports, train stations, and other public places to increase 
control over jihadist threats. It is necessary to focus on the 
reconnaissance of impending terrorist attacks and to cooperate 
with informants actively. The approach should not be to react to 
the ongoing terrorist attacks, but to act proactively and engage 
in the prevention of potential attacks.
Expert theologians capable of persuading people and turning 
them away from radical ideology must be trained, potentially 
in special educational programmes. In states where repression 
by the authorities is strong, the pressure on the people must 
be reduced and not all suspects should be arrested as this may 
contribute to their radicalisation in the future. It is important 
to work with arrested extremists, seeking de-radicalisation and 
integration of former militants into normal society. They must 
be received in a friendly atmosphere so that they do not have 
the desire to return to the warpath.
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In general, radicalisation and terrorist destabilisation directly 
depend on both the armed reaction of the authorities, and the 
economy, social support for the population and de-radicalisation. 
The international powers should consider providing all possible 
assistance for as many aspects as possible. The most important 
thing is to end the war in Libya and to direct all efforts by world 
powers towards settling conflicts politically. So far, Libya is just 
one hotbed in North Africa, but it is seriously destabilising the 
situation throughout the Mediterranean, and one should not 
wait for the fire of radicalisation to spread to Libya’s neighbours.
3.  Regular and Irregular Migration 
     Trends in a Post-Pandemic 
     Mediterranean Region
Matteo Villa, Elena Corradi
If you look at a world map, the Mediterranean Sea appears 
almost like a lake. It is no surprise, then, that migration flows 
along but especially across the two shores are much higher than 
in any other maritime region of the world. In addition to regular 
migration, the relatively short distance between Greece and 
Turkey (just a few kilometres), between Spain and Morocco/
Algeria, and between Italy and Tunisia/Libya facilitates irregular 
migration as well.
In this chapter, we analyse the impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic on migration flows between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean, and specifically regular and irregular migration 
from the southern shore towards EU countries. We find that, 
as expected, Covid-19 temporarily froze regular and irregular 
movements. But in terms of irregular migration it did so less 
than one would have imagined, and always in interaction with 
other (mostly economic) driving forces that Covid-19 heavily 
affected as well. The overall effect of the global pandemic on 
migration to Europe, then, has been to deter regular migration 
while leading to a mini-surge in irregular migration along some 
Mediterranean sea routes.
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The Evolution of Migration Flows 
Across the Mediterranean
It is unquestionable that the pandemic has had a disruptive 
effect on regular migration flows. It is still too early to know the 
exact figures, but we can rely on economic models and recent 
data to make a rough projection. For starters, any economic 
downturn has a significant effect on regular migration, deterring 
movement as recession discourages international migration 
for work purposes. However, a global recession like the one 
induced by the pandemic can also have the opposite effect, 
since diminishing incomes in countries of origin may convince 
potential migrants to move towards destinations where people 
are better off despite the recession. Therefore, the economics of 
regular migration suggest that the expected effect is ambiguous 
at best.
Irrespective of the economic angle, in practice most 
developed countries have put in place travel bans for large 
parts of 2020. Even within the Schengen area, during the first 
wave of Covid-19 Member States temporarily reintroduced 
border controls. In spite of a number of exceptions, notably 
for seasonal workers or cross-border commuters, migration has 
been hindered or outright prohibited, especially from emerging 
and developing countries towards advanced economies. While 
it is still too early to project data over the whole of 2020, there 
are worrying signs that regular migration has been effectively 
deterred.
The first way to estimate the drop in regular migration is by 
looking at air traffic flows in Europe in 2020 as compared to 
2019 (Figure 3.1). As the graph indicates, air traffic in Europe 
all but disappeared in April 2020 (-88%), only to recover 
slowly over the summer months, but by November it remained 
subdued (-57%) and was still declining as the second wave of 
infection gripped the continent.1 
1 Eurocontrol “COVID-19 Impact on the European Air Traffic Network”, 2020, 
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Fig. 3.1 - Air traffic in Europe in 2020
Source: Eurocontrol
A second impressive figure comes from recent estimates by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).2 Looking at new residence permits issued monthly 
by OECD countries, in 2019 this figure increased by 25% 
between January and June, while in the first six months of 2020 
new residence permits dropped by 75-80%. This entails a drop 
of 85% from peak to trough. If we project this trend over nine 
months for the European Union (including the UK), it would 
be equivalent to seeing just 1.0 million new residence permits 
issued in 2020 as compared to 2.8 million in 2018: a drop of 
around 65%.
The effect of Covid-19 on irregular migration appears to 
be less straightforward. In the first ten months of 2020, more 
than 70,000 people reached Spain, Italy, Malta or Greece 
accessed on 10 November 2020.
2 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2020, October 2020.
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irregularly; a 28% decrease compared to 2019.3 A significant 
drop, but not the complete halt that was initially expected from 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Irregular arrivals in Southern Europe 
were in fact gradually decreasing even before the pandemic, 
having dropped last year by 13% in comparison to 2018. Not 
surprisingly, contrary to 2018 and 2019 when the monthly 
number of irregular arrivals reached its minimum in February 
due to adverse weather conditions, this year the month with 
the fewest arrivals was April (-75% compared to 2019), 
when the spread of coronavirus had evolved into a full-blown 
pandemic across Europe. By July, however, more than 10,000 
people had once again reached Southern Europe irregularly, in 
line with July 2019. At first glance, the Covid-19 pandemic 
seems to have had only a minor and relatively temporary 
impact on irregular migration trends to Spain, Italy, Malta and 
Greece. It is only by considering the different migration routes 
across the Mediterranean separately, that the different trends 
become visible, and one can notice how other forces at play 
(in interaction with Covid-19) have shaped irregular migration 
over the last few months.
After the sharp drop in arrivals to Greece due to the 2016 
EU-Turkey agreement that essentially blocked what was by far 
the most trafficked irregular migration route to Europe, the 
number of people continuing to reach Greece irregularly has 
remained relatively low. Whilst far from the 2015 peak of more 
than 200,000 people in the sole month of October, however, 
irregular arrivals to Greece have been on the rise, especially in 
the second half of 2019 (Figure 3.2). Reception centres in the 
Greek islands soon began to reach their maximum capacity 
and by January social tensions among the islands’ residents had 
become visible. On 27 February, Turkey once again opened 
up its Western border, blaming Europe for not observing the 
agreement signed four years earlier, and allowing people to 
move freely to Greece. Turkey’s move, however, did not lead 
3 UNHCR data.
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to the big increase in arrivals that people had imagined. With 
the support of Frontex, Greece blocked people from entering 
the country, and those who managed to cross the border 
were quickly brought back to Turkey by border authorities. 
Accusations of unlawful pushbacks surged, leading UNHCR, 
human rights organisations and the Commissioner Ylva 
Johansson to urge Frontex and Greece to investigate them. 
It is against this background that the Covid-19 pandemic hit 
Greece. The country reported its first case just one day before 
Turkey’s announcement, on 26 February; only a few days later, 
on 1 March, the Greek government suspended access to asylum 
seekers for 30 days. In April, the number of irregular arrivals 
dropped to little more than 100 people. Whilst the pandemic 
did contribute to this drop in irregular arrivals, tensions with 
Turkey and the support of the EU also played an important 
part in curbing migration.
Fig. 3.2 - Irregular arrivals to Greece
Source: Frontex
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At the western end of the Mediterranean, the picture was quite 
a different one. As shown in Figure 3.3, irregular arrivals from 
Morocco to Spain increased sharply in the second half of 2018, 
but arrivals were still much lower than those recorded by Italy 
and Greece in 2014-17. Yet, Spain and Morocco were worried 
that figures would continue growing, and thus advocated EU 
financial support to Morocco for border management. In 2018, 
under the Trust Fund for Africa, the European Commission 
pledged €148 million, to be disbursed to Morocco in the first 
half of 2019; this figure was later complemented by another 
€30 million from Spain. In December 2019, the European 
Commission adopted further programmes worth €389 million.4 
This effort can be framed within the EU’s more general 
approach since 2015 to make aid and cooperation more and 
more conditional on African countries of origin and transit 
complying with international migration governance policies. 
African countries were asked to accept more returns of irregular 
migrants, an attempt that largely failed: in 2019, European 
countries returned 26,535 persons to Africa, just 6% more 
than the 25,045 persons they returned in 2014, the year before 
the approval of the European Agenda on Migration.5 However, 
a few “priority” African origin and transit countries, most 
notably Niger, were asked to help deter irregular migrants from 
transiting their territory, and did so. Departures slowed down 
and remained low throughout 2019, reaching similar levels 
to 2017: approximately 25,000 irregular migrants in total, 
compared to more than 55,000 in 2018.
4 European Commission, “The EU is boosting its support to Morocco with new 
programmes worth €389 million”, Press release, 20 December 2019.
5 Eurostat, “Statistical Presentation: Third country nationals returned following 
an order to leave”, Enforcement of  immigration legislation statistics, July 2020.
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Fig. 3.3 - Irregular migration to Spain
 
Source: Frontex
Due to an already low number of irregular arrivals in 2020, 
the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic is visible in relative terms 
(-52% in April), but in absolute terms the change is not that 
significant (497 arrivals in April 2020 compared to 1,029 
in April 2019). However, over the summer, the number of 
migrants reaching Spain slowly picked up: in September, more 
migrants reached Spain than in any month of 2019. But this 
time round, the situation was completely different from 2018: 
migrants were not reaching Spain’s mainland from Morocco 
but rather the Canary Islands from West Africa. Whilst the 
West Africa route comprised only 5% of irregular arrivals to 
Spain from January to September in 2019, it made up 34% 
of them in the same period of 2020. It would be wrong to 
consider this an effect of the pandemic: irregular arrivals to 
the Canary Islands were already increasing in the second half 
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of 2019, once the Moroccan borders were secured.6 The West 
Africa route is much more dangerous, as migrants have to cross 
the Atlantic Ocean. It is not, however, the first time that the 
Canary Islands have become a migration hotspot: in 2006, 
approximately 35,000 migrants reached the islands, mainly 
departing from Mauritania and Senegal. Back then, Spain 
deterred departures by sending money to those countries for 
development programmes and border control.
In conclusion, arrivals to Greece and Spain after the pandemic 
have shown starkly different trends: in the  former case arrivals 
have remained low for longer (albeit slowly picking up), while 
in the latter case they have quickly trended upwards, surpassing 
pre-pandemic levels. Missing from this picture is the Central 
Mediterranean route, an interesting case study we analyse in 
depth in the following section. 
Covid-19 and the Central Mediterranean Route: 
A Case Study
The Central Mediterranean route offers an interesting case study 
in evaluating the effects that the Covid-19 pandemic is having 
on irregular migration. By mid-November, Italy had recorded 
more than 32,000 migrant arrivals at its shores, a number that 
is higher than in 2018 as a whole (23,370)7, and almost three 
times that of last year. Two forces appear to have been at work 
here, acting as an incentive for migrants to depart from both 
Libya and Tunisia. And while the pandemic has had its effect, it 
was not the one many expected.
Before proceeding any further, however, it is of paramount 
importance to view these trends within a wider context. 
Irregular arrivals to Italy have indeed increased this year and we 
can expect them to reach approximately 35,000 by year end. 
6 Frontex data.
7 Italian Ministry of  the Interior, Sbarchi e accoglienza dei migranti: tutti i dati, 
“Cruscotto statistico giornaliero”, accessed on 10 November 2020.
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This figure will be significantly higher than the 19,000 average 
yearly arrivals recorded between 2002 and 2010, just before the 
popular revolts in Tunisia and Libya in 2011 brought close to 
65,000 migrants to Italy’s shores. But 35,000 arrivals annually 
is still around 80% lower than the approximately 170,000 
persons on average who reached Italy irregularly by sea each 
year between 2014 and 2016 (Figure 3.4).8 The bottom line is 
that, in fact, the period of high irregular arrivals to Italy ended 
more than three years ago, and what we are doing today is trying 
to explain an increase in numbers that are significantly much 
smaller. We might call it a “mini-surge” in irregular arrivals 
along the Central Mediterranean route.
Fig. 3.4 - Irregular sea arrivals to Italy 
(12-month moving average)
Source: elaborations on Italian Ministry of the Interior data
8 Italian Ministry of  the Interior data.
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The decline in sea arrivals after mid-July 2017 has one main 
explanation: fewer migrant departures from Libya. This in turn 
can be explained by the two-pronged action by the European 
Union and Italy to deter irregular migration from other African 
countries towards Libya, and then from Libya onwards towards 
Italy and Malta across the dangerous sea route. The first part 
of the strategy consisted in convincing countries of origin and 
(especially) transit to deter migrant crossings and movement 
towards Europe in general. For instance, Niger was one of the 
“priority” African countries of origin and transit that were asked 
to help deter irregular migrants from transiting their territory, 
with the financial support of the Trust Fund for Africa – and so 
it did. The Displacement Tracking Matrix of the International 
Organization for Migration recorded 333,000 migrants moving 
from Niger towards Libya or (much less frequently) to Algeria 
in 2016, but just 69,000 in 2017 – a decline of close to 80%.9
The second part of the strategy was more straightforward, and 
involved cooperation between the EU and Libyan authorities, 
in particular empowering the Libyan Coast Guard and avoiding 
the denunciation of smugglers detaining migrants for longer 
periods rather than sending them by sea. This brought about 
the largest fall in irregular sea arrivals to Italy ever recorded: 
starting from mid-July 2017, in the span of a few months, 
irregular sea arrivals dropped by almost 75%, from a yearly 
average of 195,000 in June 2017 to around 52,000 in June of 
the following year.10
In 2020, two factors contributed to a mini-surge in irregular 
arrivals, resulting in an increase in the number of refugees 
and so-called “economic” migrants alike. As regards refugees, 
the situation had already deteriorated well before this year’s 
pandemic. In Libya, many had been living in dire conditions, 
in or around detention centres, or in dilapidated urban 
dwellings. It is therefore not surprising that last March, at the 
9 IOM, “Niger - Population Flow Monitoring”, Dashboard 7, Displacement 
Tracking Matrix (DTM), January 2018.
10 Italian Ministry of  Interior data.
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height of the pandemic in Italy, many migrants and asylum 
seekers in Libya still regarded crossing the Mediterranean as 
a better option than choosing not to migrate. As Italy went 
into lockdown and sea arrivals dropped to a trickle (just 241 
migrants landed on Italian shores in March – an 80% decline 
compared to February), almost 1,300 migrants departed from 
Libya over a 31-day period. And while most of those who left 
Libya were brought back by the so-called Libyan Coast Guard, 
the fact that attempts continued almost unabated, despite the 
coronavirus hitting Italy hard and deterring departures from all 
other sea routes, speaks volumes about the living conditions of 
migrants and asylum seekers in the North African country. In 
the first ten months of this year, sea arrivals to Italy from Libya 
were more than 3 times higher than in 2019 (Figure 3.5).
Fig. 3.5 - Irregular sea arrivals to Italy, 
by country of embarkation
Source: UNHCR
The second factor concerns the economic and mobility effects 
of the pandemic in Tunisia. For years, Tunisia has been plagued 
by chronic unemployment and an unstable social and political 
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environment. The closure of borders has dealt a terrible blow 
to a country largely supported by tourism, which accounts 
for around 8% of the country’s GDP and employs 400,000 
workers, or 10% of the total workforce11, jeopardizing the slow 
recovery that followed the terrorist attacks on popular tourist 
destinations in 2015. Indeed, according to the latest official 
statistics, tourist arrivals in Tunisia dropped by close to 100% 
in the months of April through June.12 At the same time, tens 
of thousands of Tunisian seasonal migrant workers found 
themselves stuck in the country, unable to reach Europe to 
make a living. While likely more short-term than the plight of 
migrants in Libya, developments in Tunisia have been the main 
driver of this summer’s mini-surge in sea crossings. In July and 
August, irregular sea arrivals from Tunisia made up around two 
thirds of total arrivals to Italy. This is a stark reversal compared 
with the period of high sea arrivals to Italy (2014-16), when 
around 90% of those who reached Italy’s shores had departed 
from Libya, while Tunisia accounted for just 5% of the total. 
Furthermore, whereas irregular sea arrivals from Tunisia have 
always been fairly composite in terms of nationalities, this year 
Tunisian citizens have made up over 92% of boat passengers. 13
Conclusion
The global pandemic has had a rapid and deep impact on 
regular migration flows all over the world, and on those from 
third countries to Europe in particular. If we consider that this 
year new residence permits for the European Union could be 
65% lower than in 2019 and that this trend could well continue 
into 2021, over 1.8 million fewer migrants might reach Europe 
each year. 
11 “Economy of  Tunisia”, Fanack.com, 18 June 2020.
12 UNWTO, “World Tourism Barometer”, vol. 18, no. 5, August/September 
2020.
13 UNHCR, “Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard”, October 2020.
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As regular migration routes dry up, irregular migration risks 
increasing in parallel. The mini-surge in irregular sea arrivals to 
Italy is an interesting case study that highlights the complexity 
of the pandemic’s impact on migrants’ decisions to attempt to 
reach Europe irregularly. Firstly, it shows that in countries that 
are sufficiently close to Europe, expectations of “involuntary 
immobility” have been largely exaggerated. While involuntary 
immobility appears to be actually happening for those living 
further away from developed countries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, migrants in countries close to Europe in many 
instances not only have the motivation, but also the means to 
cross the Mediterranean.
Secondly, the mini-surge shows how hard it continues to be 
to predict trends in irregular arrivals, as sudden variations can 
reverse previous trends in a matter of months or even weeks. 
Had arrivals from Tunisia followed the same seasonal trend 
as in 2019, we could have foreseen around 15,000 irregular 
arrivals to Italy by year end – i.e. around 60% fewer than the 
35,000 we are expecting now.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the mini-surge shows that the 
Covid-19 pandemic has had a wealth of different, if not entirely 
unexpected, effects on short-term migration movements along 
and across the two shores of the Mediterranean that deserve to 
be further investigated. However, long-term migration drivers 
such as demographic trends, economic opportunities, family 
and social networks abroad will continue to shape willingness to 
migrate in the post-pandemic world, whether regularly or not.
4.  Prospects for International 
     Cooperation in the MENA Crises: 
     The Cases of Lebanon and Syria 
Chiara Lovotti
As the end of the turbulent year that was 2020 approaches, it 
is easy to look back and dwell on all that was lost, damaged, 
or destroyed by the rapid spread of Covid-19 across the world. 
While the global pandemic has certainly caused more than its 
fair share of devastation, however, it has also opened the eyes of 
the international community to matters that can no longer be 
ignored and created new opportunities to be and to do better. 
This chapter seeks to evaluate the impact the virus has had on the 
two crumbling nations of Syria and Lebanon, and also explores 
potential new avenues for collaboration between regional and 
international actors. Adopting a policy-oriented approach, it 
highlights how a crisis within a crisis has paradoxically increased 
rather than decreased the number of possibilities for cooperation 
open to both nations in a post-Covid context. 
The virus itself has not dramatically changed the situation 
in Syria or Lebanon. Rather, the worldwide pandemic has 
merely accelerated economic collapse and exacerbated the 
governmental failures that afflicted both countries even 
before Covid-19 arrived. In the first case, the pandemic has 
revealed the tragic condition of Syria’s crumbling financial and 
healthcare systems, which other nations now consider likely to 
persist unless assistance is provided. In the second case, while it 
should not have taken an explosion in Beirut’s port to break the 
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stalemate in which Lebanon has become stuck, the international 
resonance of the catastrophe undeniably shone a light on the 
flagrant incompetence of the government. The immediate 
aftermath of the blast triggered a tremendous response from 
around the world, generating solidarity both inside and outside 
the Middle East region and creating a favourable climate for 
cooperation between a wide range of countries. 
Against this background, this chapter will first provide a brief 
review of the effects Covid-19 has had on the Syrian civil war 
and on the Lebanese governmental crisis. It will then assess 
possibilities for cooperation with Lebanon from a regional 
perspective and at a European level. The chapter will end by 
detailing similar opportunities for Syria, both from a local angle 
and from the Euro-Russian standpoint, in terms of common 
goals and interests. 
Covid-19’s Impact on the Syrian Conflict  
and the Lebanese Political Crisis: An Overview 
The ongoing Syrian civil war, which monopolised the headlines 
for so long after it erupted in 2011, seems to have lost importance 
now that the world is continually confronted with the coronavirus 
pandemic. In terms of the socio-economic consequences of 
Covid-19, Syria represents a disheartening but accurate depiction 
of many other fragile states battling profound political instability 
and financial turmoil. Prior to the first outbreak of cases in March 
2020, Turkey and Russia reached an agreement which temporarily 
suspended altercations in Idlib after the Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow.1 A 
noteworthy element of the ceasefire was the formulation of a 6 
km security corridor bordering the north and south extremities 
of Idlib and including the important M4 motorway that 
connects the northwest province to the government-controlled 
1 G. Tuysuz and I. Kottasova, “Turkey and Russia announce ceasefire in 
northwest Syria”, CNN, 5 March 2020.
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cities of Aleppo and Latakia.2 While the truce suspended fighting 
between Syrian opposition forces and those faithful to Assad, 
it also exposed an extensive humanitarian crisis and could not 
prevent the already shattered Syrian population from suffering 
more virus-related deaths. 
The sectors that have since been hit hardest are the healthcare 
and financial systems that were already extremely weak and 
struggling to recover from nine consecutive years of war. Not 
only were hospitals at full capacity before the influx of Covid-19 
patients, they were simply not prepared or equipped to provide 
them with adequate resources. A growing area of concern for 
the country has been the significant number of cases (47%) 
involving workers within health care facilities, which has in turn 
infected more patients.3 Given the country’s history of heavy 
sanctions and bitter fighting, Syria’s economy has for some time 
suffered from a serious lack of investments. The scale of the 
economic crisis facing Syria placed it in a position in which 
it frankly could not afford to shut down or adopt long-term 
lockdowns like other countries. The initial measures that were 
adopted, such as closing the borders and imposing a curfew, 
combined with the pre-existing fragility of the economy, 
provoked a significant fall in the value of the Syrian pound and 
a sharp increase in prices. The cost of basic protective equipment 
in Syria is therefore extremely high. This has created, among 
other issues, a fundamental testing crisis, with only five centres 
existing in the whole country.4 This is a key problem as over 
80% of the Syrian population lives below the world poverty 
line (surviving on less than a dollar per day) and hence cannot 
afford face masks, hand sanitisers or any of the essentials needed 
to prevent infection.5 Inevitably, a powerful second wave seems 
2 Ibid. 
3 “Syrian Arab Republic: COVID-19 Response”, updated No. 8, reliefweb, 4 
August 2020.
4 OCHA, WHO, Syrian Arab Republic, Response COVID-19 Update no. 6, 19 
June 2020.
5 “UN: More than 80% of  Syrians live below poverty line”, Al Arabiya, 30 April 2016. 
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to be hitting Syria as of October 2020; the total number of cases 
now amounts to over 5,633 and 281 deaths (numbers that seem 
far too low for a country in such war-torn conditions).6 These 
injustices resonated deeply with locals who lost family members 
and ultimately resulted in the eruption of civil protests in the 
capital, a rare occurrence given the power the government holds 
there. The failing economy and the virus seem to be threatening 
the Assad regime in a way the civil conflict never has. 
Lebanon, Syria’s closest neighbour, was also hit by the 
Covid-19 crisis at a time when Damascus was already 
experiencing political and economic catastrophe. The country 
was facing profound economic woes even before the onset of 
the epidemic. Lebanon had the third highest public debt-to-
GDP rate in the world (at 170%), a 25% unemployment rate, 
and around a third of its population living under the poverty 
line.7 In addition, in October, the Lebanese pound crumbled 
against the dollar because of a shortage in the nation’s foreign 
currency reserves. Later in the Autumn, people flooded the 
streets to protest the deficiency of basic government services, 
power cuts, slow internet and unsafe drinking water, and 
strongly opposed a series of newly proposed taxes on goods like 
tobacco, petrol and WhatsApp calls. Ultimately, the protests 
led to the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his 
government. Interestingly, as in other Middle Eastern states 
like Iraq, these protests involved people from across sectarian 
lines, a testament to the widespread dissatisfaction with the 
results of years of economic mismanagement, corruption, and 
lack of reform. In March 2020, Prime Minister Hassan Diab 
announced that Lebanon would default for the first time in 
history on its US$1.2 billion Eurobond debt because of the 
profound financial crisis rocking the country.8 
6 As of  30 October 2020, according to Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, 
Coronavirus Resource Center, Syria. 
7 “Lebanon: Why the country is in crisis”, BBC, 5 August 2020.
8 “Lebanon to default on debt for first time amid financial crisis”, The Guardian, 
7 March 2020.
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In the meantime, prices have soared as the Lebanese pound has 
collapsed, the government has been unable to fund the import of 
wheat and medicines, and hospitals have had to lay off staff and 
cancel surgery because of shortages of electricity. Early solutions 
appear unlikely as the ruling elites have been sceptical of reforms 
and unwilling to accept the strings attached to international 
aid. This immobility was further seen with the 4 August blast at 
the port of Beirut, which killed 190 people, injured thousands 
and left 300,000 people homeless. The explosion embodied 
the stagnation of the Lebanese political scene, and exposed to 
the world the corruption and inefficiencies of a state apparatus 
which had essentially left 2,750 tons of deadly ammonium 
nitrate unsafely stored in the port.9 The explosion sparked even 
more public outrage at the government, and protests followed 
demanding justice and accountability. The movement forced 
Prime Minister Diab and his cabinet to resign in August, as the 
Lebanese parliament enacted a state of emergency granting powers 
to the military, setting curfews and banning public gatherings.10 
In this context, the Coronavirus pandemic found a severely 
weakened and fragile state. While numbers have been low 
compared to other countries in the Middle East, Lebanon 
has still seen 77,778 people test positive and 610 deceased.11 
Furthermore, while cases in the Spring were limited, the country 
witnessed large increases between July and September, at a time 
when the political and economic crises were reaching new lows. 
Large cities like Beirut and Tripoli have so far experienced the 
highest number of cases and, while gross numbers have not 
been similar to those in European countries, the state of the 
Lebanese healthcare system is a source of concern if figures rise.
9 “Beirut explosion: What we know so far”, BBC, 11 August 2020.
10 J. Malsin, B. Faucon, and N. Osseiran “Beirut Explosion Likely Sparked by 
Maintenance at Warehouse, According to U.S. Assessment”, The Wall Street 
Journal, 13 August 2020. 
11 As of  30 October 2020, according to Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, 
Coronavirus Resource Center, Lebanon.
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The Case of Lebanon
The tragic explosion in Beirut has nonetheless presented Lebanon 
with an unprecedented opportunity to overcome its structural 
economic and political issues through increased international 
cooperation. While it should not have required such a deadly 
blast to break the impasse, the disaster’s global resonance has 
undoubtedly focused a spotlight on the gross inefficiencies and 
political laissez-faire of Lebanese governance. This in turn has 
opened several avenues for international cooperation with both 
regional and extra-regional partners, which could ultimately 
have a positive fallout and help improve the Lebanese economy 
and political scene. 
Regional level 
With regard to regional collaboration between Middle Eastern 
powers, one key development has been the fostering of deeper 
relations between Iran and Lebanon. Only a few days prior to 
the port explosion, Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon met with the 
Lebanese Prime Minister, Hassan Diab, to confirm Tehran’s 
willingness to expand partnerships with Beirut in many areas. 
On this matter, the Prime Minister further added that, “the 
development of relations between Iran and Lebanon is on our 
agenda”.12 Iran stuck to this promise, sending over two different 
aid shipments after the explosion, each containing considerable 
food and medical supplies. Tehran also pledged its support for 
treating the victims, setting up a temporary field hospital and 
flying over a medical team composed of 37 different specialists 
to assist in the tragedy.13 
These steps taken by Iran were not coincidental; they provided 
a way to secure vital strategic interests in Lebanon that Iran is 
determined not to lose. Tehran is a vital partner of Hezbollah, 
who also happen to control the Lebanese Health Ministry. 
12 “Iran, Lebanon to Boost Cooperation”, Iran Press, 30 July 2020. 
13 S.Z. Mehdi, Iran sends aid to Lebanon over explosion at Beirut port, AA, 6 August 2020.
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It was therefore a top priority for the Iranian government to 
ensure that humanitarian aid was provided and distributed in a 
manner that would help to reinforce Hezbollah’s standing and 
credibility. By appearing as a protector of Lebanon’s population, 
Iran has ensured that its closest ally – Hezbollah – maintains its 
predominant political and military position within the country. 
We are also likely to see increased cooperation between the two 
powers in the future as they both seek to remove U.S. presence 
from Lebanese soil once and for all.
European level 
The immediate aftermath of the blast saw a massive global 
response. Among the first European countries to respond was 
France, which shares a historic links with Lebanon. The biggest 
aid provider after the event was the European Union itself, 
which airlifted and shipped a total of 29 tonnes of essential 
humanitarian supplies and medical equipment and provided 
an additional €64 million in emergency support.14 While this 
response was extremely beneficial for the country in need, the 
collective efforts were not as well coordinated as they could 
have been, given that only certain member states decided 
to contribute (unequally). Other important contributions 
were made by several countries: Russia sent five aircraft 
with emergency medical teams, and a significant number of 
Middle Eastern powers also helped, putting aside economic 
grudges in favour of humanitarian solidarity. Ultimately, the 
catastrophe brought the international community together 
and moved many countries not only to send condolences but 
also to become involved in the reconstruction of Lebanon, and 
specifically the port of Beirut.15 The latter is Lebanon’s primary 
point of access to imports and has often been deemed the 
14 European Commission, “Lebanon: EU delivers additional emergency 
assistance following the explosion in Beirut”.
15 “The international community turns out to rebuild Lebanon”, Atalayar, 5 
August 2020.
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gateway to the Middle East. In light of this, it can be assumed 
that the dignitary responsible for rebuilding the port will later 
exercise tight control over it and become a key beneficiary of its 
future trading activities. Given such a context, while the help 
proffered has, on one hand, opened the door to opportunities 
for future cooperation, it has, on the other hand, also created 
a potential race for geopolitical clout.16 Contestants include 
not just France, as mentioned above, but other nations like 
China and Turkey too. Prior to the August blast, Chinese 
port merchants were particularly interested in taking over 
the management of the capital’s container terminal, starting 
in 2020. Given that Chinese firms already hold influence 
in other regional ports (Egypt, Israel, Greece), ensuring a 
base in Lebanon would guarantee control over the primary 
Eastern Mediterranean maritime trade routes.17 As for Turkey, 
considering that its only maritime bases are located within the 
country itself, the port of Beirut constitutes a chance for it to 
consolidate and expand its power.  
It was France that played the most visible role among 
European countries as a major economic partner of Beirut. The 
French President conducted two diplomatic visits to Lebanon 
in less than one month following the explosion. Furthermore, 
France provided more tangible help by organising an emergency 
global virtual conference on 9 August.18 Led by Macron, the 
event attracted leaders from all over North America, Australia, 
the European Union, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and the 
Middle East as well as officials from the Arab League, the 
IMF, and the Red Cross. In total, US$300 million were raised 
and pledged in aid to help relieve the Lebanese people, not 
the government.19 It is important to make this distinction as 
16 “Rebuilding the Port of  Beirut: a competition for geopolitical influence”, 
Global Risk Insights, October 2020.
17 Ibid. 
18 C. Foreman, “Donors pledge aid for Lebanon during virtual conference”, 
Middle East Business Intelligence (MEED), 10 August 2020.
19 Ibid. 
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all too often funds donated by the international community 
to Lebanon have fallen into the wrong hands. Many nations 
therefore had to overcome a fear of corruption before lending a 
hand. Lebanon’s untrustworthy financial reputation combined 
with its governmental failures and inability to present a united 
front have been and continue to be the greatest hindrances 
to the country’s ability to receive rescue packages rather 
than sanctions. Nonetheless, France’s active humanitarian 
involvement in solving the Lebanon crisis has also shone light 
on the country’s turbulent past and the French colonisation of 
Lebanon and Syria. In a speech given shortly after the explosion, 
Macron called for a “new political order” which left many 
wondering if the primary objective behind his collaboration 
was not humanitarian but a first step towards regime change. 
This is particularly interesting given that among the attendees 
(and donors) at the conference was Israel, a long-time ally of 
France but a particularly destructive force in Lebanon. There is 
no doubt that fundamental political reforms must take place in 
Beirut, but how these will be achieved or initiated remains to be 
seen. One potential way forward could be a coalition between 
France and Israel. 
While potentially benefiting Lebanon, France’s proactive 
approach has also raised questions about the need for a 
coordinated EU response. In a recent conference on the matter 
hosted by the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
specific concern was raised regarding the substantial role that 
member states (foreign interventions) can play in solving 
Lebanon’s fundamental problems.20 In other words, how much 
of the burden falls (or should fall) on individual EU member 
states rather than on the EU acting as an institution. Currently, 
there is a distinct discrepancy between the latter’s role in 
Lebanon and the policies of individual countries (France, Italy, 
Germany, etc.). This has ultimately resulted in France pursuing 
20 “After Beirut’s blast: a coordinated EU response for Lebanon?”, webinar, 
CEPS, 15 September 2020.
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a distinct foreign policy aimed at securing benefits for itself 
rather than for the EU.21 If the institution wishes to avoid 
another mishap like Libya, it needs to stand up to member-
states and come up with an all-around solution. It is no secret 
that the powerful partnership between the EU and Lebanon 
is of strategic importance, and that the country’s long-term 
reconstruction is a priority. Nonetheless, Europe must carefully 
ensure that its external interventions do not override the desire 
and push for change coming from within Lebanon.  
The Case of Syria 
The dynamics of the Syrian conflict have hindered to a great 
extent the ability of both international and regional actors to 
come up with a united and effective response to the pandemic. 
One recent development stems from a potential avenue for 
cooperation deriving from Russia’s active role in rebuilding 
the country and its economy. In September 2020, a Russian 
delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov and 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, visited Syria’s capital for the 
first time since 2012. The trip to Damascus was to discuss an 
economic pact with the Assad government due to be signed 
during the delegation’s next visit in December. The deal outlines 
a large number of new projects revolving around the energy 
sector and the rebuilding of power stations, all with the goal 
of increasing trade and deepening economic ties between the 
two countries.22 Undeniably, from a political standpoint, one 
of the primary incentives for Russia to strengthen relations with 
Syria is the hope of bypassing U.S. sanctions. Furthermore, 
reconstruction represents a key opportunity for Moscow to 
establish long-term strategic interests and ensure political 
21 S. Hamdi, “On Libya, the EU Must Stand Up to France”, InsideArabia, 31 July 
2020.
22 A. Aji, “Russian delegation in Syria to expand trade, economic ties”, abcNews, 
7 September 2020.
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stability both in the country itself and in the overall region. 
This tenet is also shared by the EU, likely the most important 
donor in humanitarian and economic aid to Syria. Although 
it has a fundamentally different approach than Russia, the EU 
also shares the aims of combatting terrorism and restoring 
post-conflict Syria as a unified state in order to guarantee 
greater security. As such, the situation in Syria presents an 
additional prospect for “selective” cooperation between Russia 
and the EU, who could work together to rebuild the country 
while introducing themselves as key players in any future war 
settlement. Certainly, these routes for collaboration will not be 
easy and will demand close monitoring. On one hand, in most 
cases, Russian aid has not gone directly to the Syrians but rather 
to militiamen; on the other hand, Syria is in no way able to 
meet the EU’s strict criteria for access to relief. 
Regional level
The prospects for regional cooperation within the Syrian conflict 
in a post-Covid context are limited given the severe economic 
effects the pandemic has had on the Middle East, resulting in 
decreased availability of resources. Specifically, the sudden fall 
in the price of oil has been hard on many of the Gulf states. 
Nevertheless, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stepped up 
and pledged to help the suffering country. Abu Dhabi’s Crown 
Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed, as reported on Twitter, met the 
Syrian President in March and “assured him of the support of 
the UAE and its willingness to help the Syrian people” because 
“solidarity during trying times supersedes all matters”. This 
occurrence is particularly relevant given that it is the first time 
since 2011, when Syria was suspended from the Arab League, 
that an Arab leader has publicly acknowledged meeting Bashar 
al-Assad. The UAE’s move was most likely politically motivated 
by the hope that the Assad regime will, in time, increase military 
pressure on the UAE’s regional opponent, Turkey, by resuming 
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operations in Idlib.23 Increased cooperation between Arab 
League countries and Syria was further witnessed in September 
2020, when Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan met with 
the support of Egypt to promote unity against Turkish forces.24 
Such a rare instance of solidarity highlights the softening stance 
of various Middle Eastern powers towards the Syrian regime, 
as many seem to realise that they can benefit from cooperating 
with Assad’s government, by profiting both from post-war 
reconstruction business opportunities and from developments 
on the Libyan front. As an ally of Turkey, the emergence of Libya 
as a potential independent and oil-rich nation is a situation that 
would be problematic for the UAE-Egypt duo and is therefore 
something both nations are trying to prevent. In a similar 
fashion, Turkey, with important strategic interests to maintain 
within Syria also has reasons to cooperate with Damascus. One 
of Ankara’s main concerns at the moment relates to the almost 
1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Northwest 
province of Syria, within close proximity to Turkey’s borders. 
Although the Turkish government has expressed the need to 
create buffer zones for IDPs, accomplishing such a goal would 
require enlisting the aid of stronger EU powers and perhaps the 
United States. Given the difficult economic situation Turkey 
finds itself in, it also needs to obtain international funds which 
ultimately may compel it to consider America’s position more 
closely. 
Additional prospects for stabilisation and power balance 
come from the Astana process signed by Russia, Turkey, and 
Iran in 2017 as an agreement to work collectively to resolve the 
Syrian civil war. While the approach initially had some successful 
results, Turkey and Russia have since bypassed Iran in negotiating 
deals for interventions in Idlib. Bilateral arrangements such as 
the one cut in March of 2020 are presumably not going to 
23 G.Cafiero, Why the Uae Is Helping Syria and Iran to Cope With Covid-19, ISPI 
Commentary, ISPI, 25 May 2020. 
24 “Why are Arab states uniting to support the Syrian regime against Turkey?”, 
TRTWorld, 5 October 2020.
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please Tehran. Although Iran’s focus has shifted to Iraq since the 
killing of Qasem Soleimani, the country still has strong military 
ties with Syrian forces through the Syria-Iran Military Pact 
signed in 2018 to increase defence cooperation. What the death 
of the Iranian Major General actually accomplished was the 
reinforcement of Iran’s determination to end the U.S. military 
presence in Syria, a goal it shares with the Assad government 
and Russia. In the foreseeable future, such an opportunity 
could bring Iran and Russia (Syria’s closest Middle Eastern 
allies) closer together against Turkey and the U.S. 
European-Russian level  
Ever since the so-called “Arab Spring” movements emerged 
throughout the MENA region, European-Russian collaboration 
within this environment has been fluctuating. This has been 
typified by the attempts at regime change in both Syria and 
Libya, which have often caused discord between the two 
parties, given the different motives and approaches of each. 
Whereas the EU has been very much in favour of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) proposing foreign military 
interventions as a way to secure regime change, Moscow has 
always vigorously opposed this and shows no intention of 
approving such an initiative. This disagreement was again 
apparent in July 2015, when Russia’s participation in the efforts 
of the EU 3+3 talks on Iran’s nuclear file initially raised hopes 
for further cooperation on other MENA dossiers (regardless of 
the unfolding Ukrainian crisis). Such hopes rapidly crumbled 
when Russia launched its Syrian military campaign shortly 
afterwards. Moscow’s unconditional support for the Assad 
regime, along with disinformation campaigns it runs within 
and outside of the country, are among the primary causes of 
the severely strained relations between European powers and 
Russia. However, complexity does not mean impossibility. On 
the contrary, the Syrian case stands out as perhaps the most 
obvious opportunity for powerful actors like Europe and Russia 
to cooperate, despite fluctuating relations and obstacles.  
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In order to outline a framework for potential European-Russia 
cooperation, it is first and foremost essential to understand the 
causes of animosity. To date, a European-Russian compromise 
over Syria has been hampered mainly by the two actors holding 
significantly different views over the origins of the Syrian 
crisis itself. Since the very beginning of the Syrian civil war in 
March 2011, both have attributed the eruption of unrest in the 
country to different factors, and this has caused them to move 
along parallel lines in seeking a solution. On the one hand, 
Europe has for the most part argued that the conflict originated 
in a legitimate, popular uprising against an authoritarian 
regime deemed incapable of guaranteeing the social contract. 
Before the crisis was exploited by jihadist groups seeking to 
increase their influence in Syria, the West had hoped for the 
downfall of the Assad regime and the creation of a democratic 
government that would be inclusive and representative of all 
Syrian opposition parties. At the centre of European criticism 
was and still is the very nature of the government in power, 
as well as the international support it relies on. On the other 
hand, the Russians saw the 2011 uprising as an existential threat 
to the Assad regime, perceived by Moscow as the sole feasible 
guarantor of security and the only force able to resist religious 
fundamentalism (confidence, however, which appears to be 
weakening lately). Basically, Russia believes that EU countries 
have misinterpreted the situation in Syria, and that instead, 
Assad’s defeat would allow for the establishment of a radical 
Sunni-led regime like Islamic State that would undermine the 
geostrategic interests of both Russians and Europeans. Overall, 
throughout the duration of the conflict, Moscow has opposed 
every Syrian force perceived as a threat to the regime, and, 
broadly speaking, the West’s “democratisation agenda” for the 
MENA region. In Russian eyes, the ceaseless goal of regime 
change pursued by the U.S. is what has been responsible for 
wrecking countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. 
Accordingly, such conflicting conclusions are reflected in 
opposing policies regarding Syria. While the EU has harshly 
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condemned the Assad regime since the beginning of the war, 
Russia has shielded it and allowed President Assad to stay in 
power, in some ways “winning” the war for him. These stances 
have translated into vastly different actions towards the country. 
Whereas the majority of EU member states – with the exception 
of France and the UK – have disengaged from the conflict while 
continuing to provide significant humanitarian aid, Russia 
has opted for an interventionist approach and led a military 
campaign. The Europeans have supplied more than €17 billion 
in aid to Syrians living inside and outside the country over the 
course of the conflict.25 On the contrary, Russia’s intervention 
in the war since 2015 has centred on helping the Assad regime 
regain (and now maintain) power. The result of this prolonged 
situation is that today, the EU, its member states, and Russia 
all enjoy very different degrees of power and influence within 
Syria. Moscow, by emerging as power-broker in the conflict, 
has achieved greater leverage over Assad and a right to dialogue 
with key stakeholders in the crisis. Such a position has 
seemingly overshadowed the European nations and prevented 
them from playing any significant political role in the conflict. 
Governmental interactions between the EU and Syria are 
therefore extremely limited. The EU still applies sanctions to 
the war-torn country and only a few member states are open to 
dialogue with Damascus. 
The current situation, however, urgently calls for both 
Europeans and Russians to review and overcome their 
differences. On the one hand, if the Europeans continue to 
shun dialogue with Russia, they risk remaining frozen out 
from the Syrian crisis and post-conflict reconstruction. This is 
without mentioning the consequences that further European 
isolation may have in relation to powers such as China, who are 
determined to gain a foothold within Syria. On the other hand, 
if Russia does not contribute to creating the conditions necessary 
for improved communication with the EU and its member 
25 European Council, “Syria: Council response to the crisis”.
Prospects for International Cooperation in the MENA Crises 65
states, it also faces significant risks. Moscow could potentially 
become the victim of the “Russian Pax” it has created if Syria 
continues to suffer interference from countries like Turkey, 
Iran, the Gulf monarchies, and Israel while being ruled by a 
dictator who enjoys neither European or international support.
While these circumstances might be regarded as an impasse, 
they also represent an opportunity (though with many difficulties 
attached) to explore paths for EU-Russian cooperation. The 
deep-rooted differences described above need not invalidate 
the interests and goals that Europeans and Russians do share. 
Among these are, first and foremost, a desire for stability and 
political arrangement, a possible return of refugees, and a desire 
for the post-war reconstruction of Syria. Each of these objectives 
will be examined in greater detail below. 
Stability and political arrangement
The notion of “stability” evidently holds different meanings for 
the EU and Russia. While the former believes that stabilising 
Syria requires a genuine revolution and thus regime change, 
the latter sees stability being accomplished through the status 
quo rather than revolutionary change. Regardless of their 
divergence, ultimately, both actors share the overarching goal of 
ending the Syrian conflict and establishing a successful political 
arrangement encompassing the drafting of a new constitution. 
In this regard, both actors might find it useful to take a step 
back from their respective original positions. On the one hand, 
while the removal of Assad has long been non-negotiable for 
the Europeans, it is now obvious that no political transition 
will occur any time soon without him. This is not solely because 
Russia is unwilling to give up on Assad, but rather because, to 
put it simply, there is no other alternative to his government 
in Syria at present. On the other hand, what used to be a non-
negotiable component for Russia, that the president maintain 
full control over the country, is slowly changing. Moscow seems 
to have grasped that something has to be done to pressurise 
Assad into making concessions. Hence, the EU and Russia 
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could potentially be driven to work towards a compromise 
political transition: a transition in which perhaps Assad does not 
give up his role, but instead relinquishes political and economic 
concessions to the Syrian opposition and international forces.
The return of refugees
Another interest common to Europeans and Russians concerns 
the return of refugees, both from Europe and from within the 
MENA region. Of particular relevance are the refugee camps 
located in the latter, as they are deemed more vulnerable to 
radicalisation. On this subject, the disadvantage faced by 
Brussels and other European governments – much more 
seriously affected by the consequences of the conflict than Russia 
– of having reduced influence in Syria may force them to ask 
Russia for more tangible progress on the ground. As the EU and 
its member states are primarily interested in guaranteeing safe 
conditions for the return of refugees, many of whom have found 
shelter in Europe, these requests would presumably involve the 
implementation of UNHCR regulations. Given that Russia 
has also claimed that their return is a priority and essential for 
Syria’s recovery, it could perhaps allow implementation of the 
necessary procedures. Seeing that the EU has subordinated its 
engagement to forcing concessions from Damascus through 
sanctions and political actions, Russia may well be in a better 
position to enforce these compromises.    
Reconstruction
The post-war reconstruction of Syria is possibly the objective that 
has the greatest potential to push Europe to work with Russia. 
That is because both positions on this matter are much closer 
than on other dossiers, as there are clear business incentives for 
engagement in rebuilding the country. However, involvement 
of the two parties is motivated by different intentions. Whereas 
the EU is extremely reluctant to engage in rebuilding Assad’s 
Syria, Moscow has no means to offer further economic aid to 
Damascus. Yet the post-conflict reconstruction offers other 
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possibilities for cooperation: if Russia is financially unable to 
rebuild, it should then evaluate whom it wants to empower in 
the process. Opening to Europe could in this case be extremely 
beneficial.  
Overall, since Syria remains the greatest crisis to affect the 
Southern regions of Europe and Russia, finding new paths for 
cooperation in the country is in the interest of both actors. 
Nevertheless, a “no illusion approach” needs to be adopted 
with respect to any future EU-Russian collaboration. In order 
to avoid over-optimistic expectations, both actors must bear 
in mind the nature of their partnership, which will likely be 
unbalanced in terms of concrete limitations and outcomes, 
given that they both play very different roles in the country. 
Most importantly, EU-Russian cooperation on the Syrian 
crisis should not be developed on a “crisis resolution” basis, but 
rather on a “crisis management” one. Lessening apprehensions 
and hopes on both sides might actually increase the chances of 
commonly defining realistic, achievable targets that could bring 
about more tangible results for the good of the Syrian people.   
5.  Libya in the Covid-19 Era: 
     Between Local Chaos and 
     Foreign Interferences
Andrey Chuprygin 
While the Libyan crisis has been on and off the frontpages of 
the international agenda, it is often linked to Russia every time 
it hits the headlines. Whether the issue rotates around political 
toing and froing or military tales of the frontline variety, Russia 
is bound to be somewhere in the heart of the discussion. Of 
late, a few new dimensions have been added to the Libyan file, 
of which Turkey and Covid-19 are the most pressing. What 
exactly does Russia do in the complicated Libyan environment? 
How does this correlate with the Turkish attempt to gain a 
foothold in this North African and Mediterranean country? 
Such questions, and the related commitments and developments 
on these matters, are the focus of this piece. 
The Russian connection to the Libyan case has been 
voluntarily or otherwise the virtual cornerstone of any political 
activity even remotely connected to this North African country. 
Whenever and whoever starts discussing Libya, regardless of the 
topic or subject, one can practically guarantee Russia is going to 
be mentioned. For some, Russian involvement is a blessing, for 
others it is a curse. Nothing in between. It is somehow flattering 
on one hand and bewildering on the other. Flattering in that, 
against the odds, Russia has become an important player in the 
Mediterranean, thus to a certain extent fulfilling the historical 
Libya in the Covid-19 Era 69
legacy of the Eastern Policy of Katherine the Great,1 and 
bewildering in that it is very difficult to pinpoint how exactly 
Russia is influencing the Libyan conundrum and what, if any, 
the consequences of this influence are. 
Then there is Turkey, of course, coming through with the 
grand imperial idea of the Neo-Uthmanic narrative, the “Mavi 
Vatan”2 strategic doctrine and the ethereal thirst for new 
energy resources which, coupled with the dream of the “Great 
Resurrection”, defines the current Turkish Mediterranean 
Paradigm and plunges the North Atlantic military and political 
construct into a turmoil of epic proportions. It really is a source 
of real wonder and curiosity how one Southern Mediterranean 
country (Libya), coupled with the one military political misstep 
in 2011,3 has defined major shifts in Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern constructs during the first quarter of the XXI century.
And, of course there is Covid-19, the Plague of the Century 
that needs serious consideration. However, this issue is not really 
going to be covered here. The argument underscoring this work 
is that Covid-19 might have exacerbated circumstances, played 
it has played little if any role in the development of the Libyan 
crisis and it is being artificially introduced into the political 
discourse in order to underscore the humanitarian aspect of 
civil unrest in Libya.
Since the time of Qaddafi, Libyan leadership was very non-
Soviet, if I may put it that way. There were never brotherly 
1 See, for example: E. Smilyanskaya, Russian Warriors in the Land of  Miltiades and 
Themistocles: The Colonial Ambitions of  Catherine the Great in the Mediterranean, Higher 
School of  Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 55/HUM/2014, 13 May 
13, 2014.
2 The Turkish doctrine, known as “The Blue Homeland Doctrine” (Mavi 
Vatan), was formulated by Admiral Cem Gurdeniz in 2006. It is aimed at 
ensuringTurkey’s control in the three seas surrounding it, strengthening its 
regional and international influence and obtaining energy resources, to support 
its economic and demographic growth without dependence on third countries.
3 NATO interference in the Libyan domestic affairs which ended in the overthrow 
and demise of  the then Libyan leader Col. Qaddafi.
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relations and no love lost between Tripoli and Moscow.4 
Qaddafi, if anything, longed to be recognised as an equal by 
the West, especially the U.S., and used his Soviet card as a 
counterbalance in his relations with American interlocutors 
(the same could be said about his idol Gamal Abdel Naser of 
Egypt and several other Mideastern leaders).
Not much has changed since February 2011. Of all the 
political figures who have come and gone, hardly one was even 
remotely pro-Russian. So, it is impossible to consciously say 
there were highly positioned Russian agents of influence in 
Libya then, as there are none now. On top of this, Russia’s lack 
of action on the Security Council in 2011 left a bad aftertaste in 
the Libyan political milieu. Add to this a long period of practical 
disinterest in Libyan affairs, and one has the stage upon which 
Russian engagement in the Libyan drama started unfolding. 
For 5-6 years Russia played the role of a disinterested 
observer in line with the overall Mideastern approach,5 until 
the engagement in Syria changed the Russian position in the 
Middle East, bringing a proactive approach. Still in Libya, 
Moscow adopted a very cautious position. It seems there was 
an understanding of the importance of the Libyan situation in 
the context of Mediterranean politics, a temptation to fill the 
void left by the United States after Washington distanced itself 
from the volatile high-risk-no-gain situation in Libya, and the 
attractive idea of reversing negative European relations by dealing 
with the migration issue and security concerns. But instead of 
plunging headfirst into the marshland of Libyan civil war, 
Moscow decided to hedge possible risks by talking to all parties 
concerned, whatever that might mean at that specific time. 
Two problems came up immediately: 
1. Which parties specifically should it to talk to? Numerous 
divisions existed and tendencies were unclear at the best 
of times.
4 G.W. Breslauer, Soviet Strategy in the Middle East, Boston, 1990, p. 164.
5 M. Belenkaya, In Libya’s War, Russia Is Directionless - and Falling Behind, Carnegie 
Papers, 2020.
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2. The so-called partners in the West, both Europe and the 
US, immediately started searching for ulterior motives 
in Russian positions.
Regardless of the above, one has to acknowledge that for a period 
of time Moscow played well in Libya, effectively becoming a 
side to turn to both for Tobruk and Tripoli,6 at times when 
Europe displayed indifference. 
This was the case until April 2019 when the Haftar offensive 
on Tripoli became the game-changer. Not only did the internal 
political and military situation in Libya immediately become 
more dangerous and unpredictable, but the whole international 
approach to the Libyan crisis underwent a drastic change. The 
talk shifted from the “no substitute for a political solution” 
to the “Russia interfering in Libyan affairs” narrative. It was 
educational to watch the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia flagrantly violating the UN Security Council 
embargo, providing the Libyan East (meaning Haftar) with 
weapons, ammunitions and military material to which Brussels 
turned a blind eye, while the main rhetoric was about Russia 
supporting Haftar, worded precisely as “Russia meddling in 
Libyan affairs”.
On the other hand, the use of “Russian involvement”, and not 
“Russia involvement”, here is deliberate. The whole narrative is 
based on a single fact of the so-called Private Military Company 
(PMC) Wagner working the frontlines with Haftar’s Libian 
National Army (LNA). But to be fair, this started in September 
2019. And before that the main topic was Haftar’s visits to 
Moscow, which occasionally were transcribed as clear evidence 
of Moscow colluding with the Libyan East. But to be fair, one 
has to mention Maiteeq7 and other political figures from the 
Libyan West, Tripoli and Misrata. The number of their visits 
was twice the number of visits of their Eastern counterparts. 
6 House of  Representatives in Tobruk and Government of  National Accord in 
Tripoli. 
7 Ahmed Maiteeq, Vice Chairman of  the Presidential Council of  Libya, Tripoli.
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The same is true for the arms and military equipment deliveries. 
It is a documented fact that the main supplier of Haftar and 
his LNA should be sought in Cairo and Abu Dhabi. And, at 
the end of the day – it is highly unlikely that Khalifa Haftar, 
an American citizen and one-time CIA asset, embraced Russia 
with all his might. The question of who brought him back 
to Libya in the first place and financed his first steps should 
be answered before we enter the world of highly speculative 
supposition. 
In October, reports of Russian PMCs taking part in military 
activities with Haftar’s forces8 became the focus of attention 
overnight, obscuring the main problems of the rivalries in 
Libya. As a result, in European political circles the nature of 
debates about solutions in Libya shifted once again from the 
meaningful to the construed. The search for solutions was once 
again replaced by a seek-and-blame mode. 
This particular strain was found by studying analytical 
reports from several think tanks furthering the idea of Russia 
threatening US and European interests in the Mediterranean. 
This is a Freudian slip if there was one. The majority of 
the reports in question centre on the Big Game between 
international players, pushing the interests of the Libyan people 
to the margins of the discussion. There are distinct, realistic 
voices, but they are hardly heard over the white noise of the 
“Libyan experts” peddling “international interests”. But to be 
honest, neither Russian nor American interests should occupy 
such a prominent place in the debate. This place should be 
reserved solely for Libyan interests. But, of course, this is a 
naïve statement.
One might assume the main reason for the Libyanesque 
confrontations or lack thereof between major international 
parties is that even with the contradictory positioning in Libya, 
Moscow is the only player who consistently kept the doors of 
8 K. Marten, “Russia’s use of  semi-state security forces: the case of  the Wagner 
Group”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 35, no. 3, 2019, pp. 197-98.
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negotiation open with everyone, acknowledged the existence 
of multi-layered problems and positioned itself as a valid 
middleman. Which, from the point of view of Washington, is 
a problem that needs to be solved somehow. Especially against 
the backdrop of inconsistent and contradictory announcements 
by President Trump. And the constant fighting for supremacy 
between France and Italy, who support different sides of the 
conflict. Which is all very confusing. However the solution 
of isolating Moscow from the Libyan case, which seems to be 
favoured by the US and NATO, is difficult to achieve, because, 
for a significant period of time, Moscow appeared to be the 
only foreign party who, while being inactive, did not shy away 
from the Libyan crisis, and was not implicated directly in the 
2011 bombing campaign. And this contributes to shape a more 
positive image of Russia on the ground compared to others. 
But there is, suddenly, a positive side to the situation. 
Precisely because of the multi-layered Russian involvement in 
Libya, the US decided to take a more active part in the crisis, if 
not to remedy the NATO-manufactured disaster of 2011, then 
at least to spoil Russian advancement. For better or for worse 
remains to be seen. There is already a tendency for the United 
States to go its own way, outside of the Berlin framework and 
concentrating specifically on the Oil Crescent. In this, one 
could say, they are in tune with Turkey. Will this help solve 
the situation? It certainly adds to the confusion, especially 
with Egypt’s sabre-rattling and the UAE’s attempts at salvaging 
the Haftar Project. In any case, it is a positive sign as direct 
American engagement should add to the peace effort in Libya. 
Especially in the wake of the Turkish “Mediterranean 
coming-out”, which added a refreshing new factor to an old 
problem, it looks like we are once again witnessing a change of 
scene. Direct Turkish involvement in the Libyan civil war has 
led to a change in the whole Mediterranean ambiance. There 
is definitely a dramatic increase in international involvement, 
with several players rushing in at once to make sure they 
were not left behind. Libya suddenly became the “apple of 
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discord” in the Mediterranean Basin, amidst the failing NATO 
methodology, as became painfully clear through the French/
Turkish fallout and Greece desperately searching for NATO’s 
reluctant assistance. At the same time, Washington has been 
trying to placate everyone with meaningless statements, while 
there is an educated consensus the United States, if push came 
to shove, would ally itself with Turkey. This knowledge makes 
everyone anxious to timely assert their “rightful” place in the 
resulting structure of the emerging Mediterranean. The shift 
from the Eurocentric Med to the Mediterranean subjected to 
the influence of the Middle East is new and disturbing for the 
traditional Southern European heavyweights France and Italy. 
And the role of Turkey, which is the closest U.S. ally in the 
Middle East, but maintains working relations with Russia, 
contributes to the confusion. And, however one looks at it, 
Russia becomes a de facto point of convergence for practically 
all the players involved. And this might as well be instrumental 
in generating positive movement. 
The Covid-19 pandemic was touched on at the beginning of 
this piece. Debate is already underway as to how the pandemic 
is going to reshape the face of our civilisation. The argument 
here is that Covid-19 as an existential factor is only relevant 
to Western societies. In the Eastern world, in general and in 
Libya as part of the Eastern and Islamic world, Covid-19 has 
no significant impact. While definitely being an issue for health 
services, due to the lack of testing and medical facilities, it does 
not hold a major place in the country’s social psyche. Against 
the backdrop of the fallout from the civil war, the lack of basic 
amenities, the unresolved security issues, the power void and the 
Islamic tradition of Prophetic hadith,9 the Covid-19 pandemic 
is not at the forefront of the country’s problems and does not 
constitute a factor in the future of the nation. 
9 For example, see Al-Hafidz Ibnu Hajar Al-Asqolani, Kitab Badzlu al-Ma’un Fi 
Fadhli al-Tha’un (in Arabic).
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Here, one might be advised to take a closer look at the 
“non-pandemic” factors in the Libyan domestic scene. Since 
2011, many research and political papers have been produced 
exploring the ways and means of resolving the political crisis 
that followed the February revolution, as it has been called. 
The focus has often been divided between the domestic and 
international players, and their roles in a possible, or probable 
solution. The prevailing view wants us to believe the real 
problem on the road to the reconstruction and development 
in this North African country lies with the lack of consensus 
between the major regional and international players involved 
in the Libyan charade, as each one is pursuing its own interests. 
This may be so; however, the view in this chapter is that the 
main obstacle to the desired resolution hides not outside but 
inside the country. It is not Turkey, trying to use the Libyan 
theatre to further its own ambitions in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East. It is not France, trying to sabotage Turkish 
efforts. It is not Egypt, looking at its neighbour through the 
biased lens of its own national security. It is not Russia or the 
Unites States, engaged in a big shuffle dance over perceived 
national interests. The main handicap is that Libya has no 
developed civil society to provide a framework to mobilise the 
populace to political activity. And without such a framework 
one cannot realistically expect a political process, with party 
activism, elections, consensus etc.
Historically, Libya never had a chance to form such a 
framework, which we take for granted. From the Ottomans 
to the Italians, to the Brits, to the artificial kingdom, to the 
cartoonish revolution, and to the decades of paternalistic 
authoritarian in an all-encompassing one-man show, there 
never was a real chance for the country and its people to create 
an unique national independence model with an articulated 
national sense capable of evolving into a civil society platform, 
with its own heroic ethos and enshrined leaders. Through 
all these decades the country remained regionally fractured, 
with cities and tribes pursuing their own egoistic goals and 
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occasionally filling the shoes of the clients for the leader who 
happened to be in power at the time. 
To expect the country, between 2011 and now – overnight, 
in a historical sense – to develop into a sufficiently sophisticated 
environment to be able to reach a political consensus is 
naïve. And we are witnessing this every day. Recently, after 
the purported success of the 5x5 negotiations in the form of 
a permanent ceasefire, we see Haftar meeting with Eastern 
delegates and stressing his resolve to fight till the victorious end 
and calling on Tuareg tribes to join him in this noble enterprise. 
And there are the Tripoli militias, which quite expectedly refuse 
to disarm and dissolve, thus hampering the plan formulated 
by the Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha in the spirit of de-
escalation and compromise. 
All observers agree the municipalities have become a powerful 
new factor, as they have been in the process of ascertaining 
positions of influence in Libya. Local executive bodies, which 
provide the population with daily amenities, thus working 
outside the political minefield, have gained uncontested 
authority and trust among locals. In the chaos of the civil war 
and the destruction of the economy and security, municipal 
committees provide what amounts to the basis of existence for 
the people. And they have a good chance to become the nucleus 
of the new emerging civil society in Libya. 
Let us now return to the question of foreign players, which 
is no doubt very important to resolving the Libyan issue, it 
seems logical for influential countries, hosting conferences and 
negotiations between the two easily accessible parties to the 
conflict, namely the Government of National Accord (GNA) 
of Tripoli and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) of Haftar, 
to turn their attention to the parties previously ignored by the 
“big shots” as being too small and too obscure. Noticeably, 
when international NGOs aim to achieve something they turn 
to municipal authorities, not the central powers. This is a clear 
indication that local committees are in fact the real power on 
the ground, capable of mobilising and negotiating. 
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Unfortunately, working through municipal authorities 
requires a different level of involvement from international 
players, but they are not prepared to commit to this. The 
inability to work creatively and to think out of the box impedes 
all efforts by the international community. And while Europe 
scratches its collective head trying to figure what to do next, and 
while conferences are piling up on themselves and consultations 
multiply, proactive regional entrepreneurial elites are moulding 
Libya to their own ends, changing the balance in the whole of 
the Mediterranean. 
To reverse negative developments in Libya, there is a need for 
the concerted efforts of all parties concerned, built on the overall 
understanding the struggle for peace in Libya is in fact a struggle 
for peace in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, experiences last 
year showed that frontline European Mediterranean countries 
are incapable of reaching a consensus with Mideastern and North 
African countries, as well as with each other. On top of this, 
countries like France are practically incapable of imaginative 
policies in the face of new challenges from the East. The new 
era of Mideastern Tigers ascertaining their position and probing 
the waters of the Big Blue Homeland calls for a reassessment in 
political approaches. The only obstacle left to overcome is to 
acknowledge that countries like Turkey and Russia also have 
their own interests and are not going, under any conditions, to 
be left on the margins of the political process. And of course, 
there are people in Libya, and therefore their interests must be 
at the forefront of each and every development in and around 
this North African country. This is simply called realpolitik.
 
6.  Palestine and Israel in the 
      Post-Covid World
 Inès Abdel Razek
In the eyes of many Palestinians, the pandemic has brought to 
the world a taste of their experience, one of uncertainty, anxiety, 
invisibility, and being cheated by political actors that deny your 
rights. A world where you are constantly told to be resilient despite 
your environment closing in around you. Many Gazans living 
under full closure for 13 years took to social media to ask the 
world in self-derision: “Dear world, how is the lockdown? Gaza”.1
The current health crisis has sadly developed in parallel with 
the release of the Trump administration’s so-called “peace plan”, 
which emboldened both the U.S. and Israel to more displays of 
power and unilateral steps, such as advancing de facto annexation 
and the signing of normalisation agreements with like-minded 
regimes. The dispossession of Palestinians and the denial of their 
rights has been accompanied by investment on the part of the 
U.S., Israeli and allies in mainstreaming such moves as “peace”. 
There is a very loud cognitive dissonance between the ongoing 
political and diplomatic developments that are being depicted 
as peace and stability and the reality at play on the ground in 
the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan 
River (Israel-Palestine), where the imbalance of power between 
the colonised and the coloniser and a reality of apartheid are 
increasingly entrenched with every passing day.  
1 N. al-Mughrabi, “Blockaded Gaza looks wryly on as world isolates itself ”, 
Reuters, 18March 2020.
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Such dissonance has grown against the backdrop of an 
international order promoted by neo-authoritarian leaders and 
championed by Israel as a role model; these leaders include 
Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, Mohammed bin Zayed 
Al Nahyan (MBZ), Mohammad bin Salman Al Sa’ud (MBS) 
and European far-right allies, all aiming to advance nationalist 
agendas at the expense of the rule of law and human rights. 
In such a context, the Palestinian leadership, the European 
leadership and the UN, more paralysed than ever, know that 
everything is going in the wrong direction for building a better 
future for both Israelis and Palestinians. And yet, yet supporting 
alternative frameworks and resisting the neo-authoritarian world 
order feels more painful than the downward trajectory labelled 
as “status quo”. Unfortunately, the Covid-19 pandemic has only 
exacerbated structural and man-made inequalities at play in 
Israel-Palestine, whether with regards to the healthcare system, 
freedom of movement, policing and securitisation, decision-
making ability and more. Meanwhile, it has also weakened 
international will to lower the cognitive dissonance at play. 
This chapter will try to shed light on how international and 
regional trends are affecting Palestinians, the Palestinian national 
movement and the future of what is at stake in Israel-Palestine. 
It will also analyse how these trends offer an opportunity to 
reconcile the discourse with the dire reality on the ground, and in 
that regard, radically change the international community’s rules 
of engagement in Israel-Palestine, which so far have enabled de 
facto annexation and ethno-nationalist policies to thrive. 
The Leap Forward of Neo-Authoritarian World Politics
Bilateral security and military diplomacy
The so-called “Abraham Accords” signed on 15 September 
2020 at the White House represent the culmination of steadily 
growing relations between the Gulf countries and Israel over 
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the past several years,2 and advance significantly a world order 
where state security and economic interests are advanced 
through the lens of ethno-nationalism and essentialist visions of 
combating Islamic terrorism, at the expense of multilateralism 
and people’s rights at home and abroad.
The neo-authoritarian leaders behind this regional balance 
of power (MBZ, Trump, Netanyahu, MBS on the one side, 
Erdogan on the other side) aim first and foremost to consolidate 
their national defence apparatus through solid bilateral alliances. 
In that regard, Israel turned the occupation of millions of 
Palestinian into a geopolitical asset, exporting a model “tested” 
on Palestinians. It aims to place itself at the centre of a regional 
security map where the road to Washington passes through 
Tel Aviv. Being tied to Israel ensures the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) access to higher quality weapons and closer relations 
with the U.S., regardless of the presidential administration 
in place.3 The pandemic added an additional opportunity for 
Israel to export its spyware and military technologies, which are 
endangering people’s rights domestically and internationally.4 In 
July 2020, the Israeli government-affiliated aerospace industry 
company Rafael (a prominent world arms manufacturer) signed 
an agreement with G42, a private group linked to Emirati 
intelligence with the stated goal of “defeating Covid 19”.5 The 
Mossad is at the heart of engineering such a strategic regional 
approach and has replaced official diplomacy in countries with 
whom Israel does not have official relations.6
This open consolidated alliance could escalate an arms 
race in the region and would not only have consequences for 
2 A. Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order”,The New Yorker, 11 June2018.
3 O. Ajjoub and R.Aldoughli “What does “peace” even mean for the peoples of  
the Middle East?”, Al-Jumhuriya, 7 October 2020.
4 A. Kharpal, “Use of  surveillance to fight coronavirus raises concerns about 
government power after pandemic ends”, CNBC, 26 March 2020.
5 “Israeli defence companies sign ‘historic’ deal with UAE artificial intelligence 
firm”, Middle East Eye, 3 July 2020.
6 H. Rettig Gur, “Our new spymaster and the demise of  Israeli politics”, The Time 
of  Israel, 6 January 2016.
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Israel-Palestine but also for Yemen7 and other ongoing conflicts 
in the region. Israel will want to prove its influence over 
Washington for its Arab allies’ security interests, while keeping 
its military superiority, doubling down on the “Qualitative 
military edge” doctrine. Given U.S. interest in selling F-35s 
to the UAE (and Qatar), Israel is already seeking additional 
military aid8 on top of the US$38 billion it receives every year 
within the framework of the 10-year security assistance MoU 
renewed under the Obama administration.9 
Instrumentalising religion: 
continuing the “war on terror”
These agreements are sealing a realignment between Israel, the 
UAE, Bahrain and the Saudis to counter Iran’s influence in the 
region, as well as that of Erdogan’s Turkey, with the logic that 
the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Israeli diplomacy has, for 
years, tried with some degree of success to place the international 
agenda’s focus exclusively on Iran, an approach shared with its 
Gulf allies. By doing so, Israel has constantly pushed the Palestine 
question aside and whitewashed its policies and practices by 
pointing the finger at Iran (and its support to Hezbollah, Houthis 
etc.) as the greatest danger to the world’s security. Aligning with 
that trend, the UAE and its allies are portraying themselves as 
a beacon of “tolerant Islam”10 and moderation, a bulwark of 
“stability” against “disruption” and terrorism, which they depict 
as being embodied by the Muslim brotherhood, Iran and their 
proxies. These countries are anchoring a binary vision boosting 
chauvinism and justifying both domestic repressive policies and 
7  I. Jalal, UAE-Israel normalization gives rise to new risks for Yemen and the region, 
Middle East Insitute, 14 September 2020.
8 A. Egozi, “Israel Seeks $8B Arms Deal At White House: F-35s, V-22s, KC-
46s”, BreakingDefense, 15 September 2020.
9 M. Spetalnik, “U.S., Israel sign $38 billion military aid package”, Reuters, 14 
September 2016.
10 E. Fakhro, An Open Affair: As the UAE and Israel Normalize Ties, Gulf  Actors 
Respond, International Crisis Group, 20 August 2020.
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militarism abroad, as a continuation of the post 9/11 “war on 
terror”.11 This all points to a region that is ultimately more, not 
less, unstable and could continue to create much damage from 
Xinjian to Libya in the name of “freedom”. 
Packaging a dangerous “paradigm shift” 
for Israel-Palestine
One should not underestimate the political danger and 
potential mainstreaming of the “paradigm shift” such a world 
order proposes for the Palestine-Israel issue. Israelis describe it 
as “peace for peace” replacing “land for peace”;12 in other words, 
Israel can advance its diplomatic relations and the normalisation 
of its regime, regardless of Palestinians.
In this approach, Palestinians are portrayed in a patronising 
way, as perpetual rejectionists of peace offers13 leading to “fatigue” 
for the Palestinian cause. This has been mainstreamed in the 
Gulf for a few years already and in 2018, MBS was reported to 
say that “in the last several decades … the Palestinian leadership 
has missed one opportunity after the other and rejected all the 
peace proposals it was given. It is about time the Palestinians 
take the proposals and agree to come to the negotiations table 
or shut up and stop complaining”. This discourse is a distortion 
of historical facts regarding negotiation and compromises made 
by the Palestinians14 and collectively discredits them while 
allowing Israel to pursue colonisation. 
11 M. Duss, “U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror”, 
Foreign Affairs, 22 October 2020.
12 J. Sinkinson, “‘Land for peace’ is dead, long live ‘peace for peace”, jns Jewish 
News Syndacate, 13 November 2020.
13 An example in this recent interview of  former head of  Saudi intelligence 
services. “Full transcript: Prince Bandar bin Sultan’s interview on Israel-Palestine 
conflict”, Al-Arabiya, 5 October 2020. 
14 A, Gresh, “Les Palestiniens n’ont jamais raté une occasion de rater une 
occasion?”, orientXXI, 16 March 2020.
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In the West, neo-conservatives15 who have long held in 
contempt multilateralism, the UN, the International Criminal 
Court and people’s rights are supporting such a paradigm, 
asserting that human rights are conditional to the advancements 
of security – defined as “fighting terrorism” – and supported by 
Trump’s so-called “Deal of the Century” as a legitimate roadmap16 
despite its disregard for Palestinian rights and international law.17 
Meanwhile, Israel’s war to silence critical voices who challenge 
such a narrative and the policies and practices behind it risks 
further shrinking the space available to civil society, human rights 
defenders and journalists to speak up. For the past few years, 
the Israeli government, notably through its Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Strategic Affairs, and with the support of 
a network of Government-organised NGOs (GONGOs)18 and 
lobbies active in the U.S., Brussels19 and across Europe20 has been 
investing millions21 in trying to smear and criminalise efforts of 
civil society actors, activists and human rights defenders. There 
are two main strategies used at the international level: the first is 
redefining anti-Semitism22 and hate speech to include any calls 
15 See op-ed by Stephen Harper, former Canadian conservative FM, sponsor of  
the JNF and close to the Israeli nationalists, “Stephen J. Harper and Shuvaloy 
Majumdar: Why we should celebrate the Abraham Accords”, National Post, 5 
October 2020.
16 See for example American Jewish Committee (AJC) statement, “AJC Welcomes 
U.S. Effort to Advance Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Urges Return to Talks”, 
CISION, 29 January 2020.
17 See statement by 47 UN independent experts, “Israeli annexation of  parts of  
the Palestinian West Bank would break international law – UN experts call on 
the international community to ensure accountability”, United Nations Human 
Rights.
18 Y. Gurvitz and N. Rotem, “What is NGO Monitor’s connection to the Israeli 
government?”, +972magazine, 29 April 2014.
19 G. Mauzé, “Israeli Networks of  Influence in Brussels: Behind the Scenes”, 
orientXXI, 31 January 2019.
20 “The Lobby Part 1: Young Friends of  Israel”, Al Jazeera, 10 January 2017.
21 M. Jaffe-Hoffman, “Strategic Affairs Ministry to form anti-BDS legal network”, 
The Jerusalem Post, 20 December 2018.
22 Backgrounder on Efforts to Redefine Antisemitism as a Means of  Censoring Criticism of  
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to boycott the state of Israel or to define it an “apartheid state”.23 
Not only is it silencing Palestinian rights defenders but it is 
counter-productive to fighting hate, including anti-Semitism; 
indeed, some governments have used their support for Israel to 
reject accusations of anti-Semitism or sympathy towards white 
supremacy, as Trump and Orban have done.
A second tactic is to accuse Palestinian and Israeli NGOs 
and human rights defenders, particularly those working on the 
ground against settler organisations in Jerusalem or Area C, 
of sympathising with terrorism.24 Sophisticated tactics involve 
lawfare,25 harassment and cyberbullying,26 intimidation27 and 
de-platforming28 (e.g. closing of bank accounts). Such virulent 
attacks have direct political consequences and directly support 
the narrative and foreign policies described above.
In the backdrop to these international and regional 
developments characterised by pageantry and the promotion 
of doublethink,29 the reality of injustice at play in Palestine-
Israel provides a compelling explanation of why current 
political frameworks must radically shift in order to reject a 
“fait accompli” and the end of international norms. On the 
other hand, worldwide resistance against international trends 
undermining justice and equity has brought about new 
opportunities for Palestinians and allies to completely shift 
strategy in challenging structural oppression. 
Israel, Palestine Legal, 20 January 2020.
23 Recent case: L. Friedman, “Israel-Advocacy Groups Urge Facebook to Label 
Criticism of  Israel as Hate Speech”, Analysis, Jewish Current, 19 August 2020.
24 “The Clampdown On Palestine Civic Space Continues As Israel Steps Up 
Smear Campaign Against Csos”, Monitor, 21 August 2019
25 Ibid.
26 Al-Haq submits a joint urgent appeal to the United Nations Special Procedures on the 
ongoing Israeli smear campaign against Al-Haq, Al Haq Defending Human Rights, 24 
August 2019.
27 An example here: https://twitter.com/GPOIsrael/status/1260562730257448961 
28 See example of  Shurat Hadin and A. Kane, “Israel’s Scheme To Defund the 
BDS Movement”, INTHESETIMES, 11 November 2019.
29 As per the concept well articulated by Georges Orwell in his famous novel 1984.
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A One-State Reality of Apartheid
The combined factors of the Trump administration legitimising 
Israel’s annexation and the signing of the normalisation 
agreements has emboldened Israel to accelerate its dispossession 
of more land and resources and its choking of the Palestinian 
people. It is important to note that decades of U.S. bipartisan 
consensus on supporting Israeli colonisation have paved the 
way for the latest moves to support the erasure of Palestinian 
national rights, such as defunding and attacking The United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA) (and opposing the right of return) and 
moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.
The Covid-19 pandemic has distracted the world’s attention 
and provided convenient cover to accelerate settler colonial 
plans and the dispossession of Palestinians. During this 
period, Israel has increased demolitions and confiscation of 
Palestinian infrastructure,30 as well as approvals for building 
more settlements.31 Plans are advancing for the permanent 
displacement of Palestinian communities, particularly in Area 
C32 as well as in Jerusalem. At the same time, settler violence 
has spiked in total impunity.33 Israel’s regime also negatively 
affected Palestinian ability to respond to the health crisis.34 
But this merely accelerates decades-old practices. Since the 
start of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israel 
has used and abused the law of occupation under international 
30 OCHA United Nations for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, 
“Unlawful demolitions in the West Bank spike during COVID-19”, Statement 
by Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, 10 September 2020.
31 “Israel approves first West Bank settler homes since Gulf  deals”, Al Jazeera, 
14 October 2020.
32 B. White, “How Israel is waging war on Palestinians in Area C”, Middle East 
Eye, 20 September 2020. 
33 Violence and impunity in the West Bank during the COVID-19 pandemic, Briefing 
Note, OXFAM, May 2020.
34 Y. Hawari, COVID-19 in Palestine: A Pandemic in the Face of  “Settler Colonial 
Erasure”, IAI Commentaries 20 | 62, IAI, September 2020.
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humanitarian law (IHL) at will to ramp up annexation and create 
permanent occupation without raising international outrage. 
Occupation is a temporary situation where the occupying 
power assumes the role of administering in good faith a territory 
until conditions allow for its return. By contrast, annexation of 
occupied territory implies permanent transfer of sovereignty, and 
is illegal under international law.  Israel never recognised the West 
Bank and Gaza as “occupied” territory – calling it instead “Judea 
and Samaria” and “disputed territory” – and never planned to 
transfer sovereignty to Palestinians. A Human Rights Watch study 
released last year pointed out that in the West Bank, “sweeping 
restrictions are unjustified and unlawful after five decades”.35 The 
unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 also provided Israel 
with an excuse to dodge its responsibilities as the occupying 
power, while actually entrenching its military and administrative 
authority over the strip.36 Whenever convenient, successive Israeli 
governments have nonetheless used the supposedly temporary 
character of the occupation under international law to protect 
themselves from diplomatic outrage and the consequences that 
annexation would entail, while de facto advancing it. 
Since1948, in the territory between the Mediterranean River 
and the Jordan river, Israel has slowly built a sophisticated multi-
tiered institutional and legal regime for Palestinians, based on 
racial discrimination. These policies and practices have been 
dispossessing Palestinians of their civil and collective rights while 
deliberately fragmenting their population, with differentiated 
regimes for the Palestinians in the West Bank, in Gaza or East 
Jerusalem37 and for the Palestinian citizens of Israel.38 
In the occupied territories these policies have been enacted by 
systematic spatial (the Wall, check-points, roads), technological 
35 “Israel/West Bank: Grant Palestinians Equal Rights”, Human Rights Watch, 17 
December 2019
36 “Occupation under international law?”, Facts, diakonia, 2014.
37 Revocation of  Residency in East Jerusalem, Norwegian Refugee Council, January 2017.
38 “Israel: Discriminatory Land Policies Hem in Palestinians”, Human Rights 
Watch, 12 May 2020.
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(surveillance) and bureaucratic (permits) measures with control, 
dependence and segregation as the primary aim, and not security 
as claimed by Israel.39 This regime has created a “complex 
articulation of the spaces of life” between Israeli and Palestinian 
societies,40 giving the illusion that there are two distinct national 
and territorial entities, and redefining the power relationship and 
control of Israelis over Palestinians.41 
Military orders have been used and abused to repress 
Palestinians’ ability to organise,42 including through the 
systemic use of incarceration to crush dissent in the long-term. 
These orders have also been regularly used to expropriate more 
Palestinian-owned land in the name of “security”. It must be 
noted that Palestinian citizens of Israel lived under a similar 
military ruling from 1948 to the end of 1966.43
While Gaza is often set aside in the discourse around Israel’s 
annexation and colonial plans, “the isolation of Gaza has been 
implemented over the years through Israel’s control over movement, 
and has served Israel in advancing West Bank annexation, at the 
expense of Palestinian human rights”, as the Israeli human rights 
organisation Gisha explained in a recent paper.44
The epitome of this system is the prominent role played by 
the Israeli military body in charge of the occupied territories 
(the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, 
COGAT). Referred to as a “civil administration”, this institution 
under the Ministry of Defence is responsible for managing 
Israel’s control over the occupied territories. It is the main 
administration controlling the permit regime, check-points 
39 Interview with Yael Barda, specialist of  this question: E. Konrad, “Israel’s 
permit regime isn’t about security, it’s about segregation”, +972magazine, 9 
January 2019.
40 C. Parizot, Viscous Spatialities: The Spaces of  the Israeli Permit Regime of  Access and 
Movement, HAL archives-ouvertes.fr, 29 May 2017.
41 S. Abdallah and C. Parizot, De la séparation aux mobilités, 22 June 2017.
42 “Israel/West Bank: Grant Palestinians Equal Rights”…, cit.
43 “Palestinians Under Military Rule in Israel”, Palestinians Journey.
44 “Area G: From Separation to Annexation”, Globe – Legal Center for Freedom 
of  Movement, June 2020.
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policies and the blockade in Gaza, and approves or rejects 
trade, mobility, and construction proposals, basically denying 
Palestinian’s rights in the name of “security”. The paradox here 
is that COGAT has been ramping up its communication and 
public relations efforts, presenting itself as a caretaker providing 
services to the Palestinians rather than a colonial ruler that has 
enforced dependency on its decisions. One recent example 
is the olive harvest that takes place annually in the month of 
October. While COGAT is presenting itself as supporting 
farmers,45 over the years the Israeli military has increased its 
permanent restrictions of access and expropriations of these 
farmers.46 COGAT regularly briefs diplomats and donors47 to 
legitimise their policies and present itself as an interlocutor of 
reference to discuss matters that concern Palestinian lives.48 
De jure annexation would therefore validate in Israeli 
civil law what is already Israel’s de facto sovereignty over 
approximately 14 million people.49 In that regard, there is a 
growing recognition that these systemic policies and practices 
are in fact a regime of apartheid, defined as the “systematic 
oppression and domination” of one group over another in the 
territory “with the intention of maintaining that regime”. This 
is a reality that many Palestinians have long recognised50 and 
reported on at the United Nations,51 now joined by Israeli 
human rights NGOs and lawyers.52 
45 https://twitter/cogatonline/status/1305832016102002691 
46The road to olive farming, OXFAM, p. 19 
47 European Diplomats on a Strategic Tour at Israel’s Border with Gaza, ELNET, 29 
September 2020.
48 https://twitter.com/cogatonline/status/1217542090806255619 
49 S. Cypel and R. Malley, “Palestine. ‘Formal annexation won’t change anything 
on the ground’”, orientXXI, 30 June 2020.
50 A. Iraqi, “Palestinians are tired of  proving Israeli apartheid exists”, 
+972Magazine, 17 June 2020.
51 Palestinian, regional, and international groups submit report on Israeli apartheid to UN 
Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination, Al-Haq Defending Human 
Rights, 12 November 2019.
52 A. Iraqi, “‘An illegitimate regime’: How a top rights group shed Israeli myths to 
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In September 2020, 200 international and Palestinian civil 
society organisations called on the UN General Assembly to 
“launch international investigations into Israel’s apartheid 
regime over the Palestinian people as a whole, as well as 
associated State and individual criminal responsibility, including 
by reconstituting the UN Special Committee against Apartheid 
and the UN Centre Against Apartheid to end apartheid in the 
XXI century”.53
This reality began to be politically acknowledged by the West, 
notably by the Obama Administration. In 2015, Secretary of 
State John Kerry brought to the White House a stack of maps 
of the West Bank that were prepared by the State Department 
and vetted by U.S. intelligence agencies. As an Obama adviser 
put it: “No matter what metric you’re using – existing blocs, 
new settlements, illegal outposts – you’re confronting the end 
of the two-state solution”.54
Will We Finally Stop Pretending 
That There Is a MEPP? 
The comfort of a process to avoid hard choices
The international community jumped feet first in presenting 
the Abraham Accords and normalisation as an opportunity 
to re-launch negotiations,55 just as it welcomed the Trump 
administration’s “efforts”56 with its so-called “deal of the 
century”. These reactions are an example of the loud cognitive 
recognize apartheid”, +972Magazine, 9 July 2020.
53 Global Response to Israeli apartheid: A call to the UNGA from Palestinian and 
international Civil Society Organizations, Al-Haq Defending Human Rights, 22 
September 2020.
54 A. Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order”, The New Yorker, 18 June 
2018.
55 European Union, External Action, “Israel: High Representative/Vice-
President Borrell speaks to Foreign Minister Ashkenazi”, 18 September 2020.
56 Ref  French reaction.
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dissonance between what the Middle East Peace Process 
(MEPP) stands for and what actual peace underpinned by 
rights and justice means.
There is an ever-fading illusion from the Palestinian 
establishment and the EU that the Oslo-configured MEPP of 
direct negotiations can be revived. Yet, as Daniel Levy stated in 
his briefing to the UN Security Council in July 2020. 
The peace process, as currently framed and pursued, offers a 
place of refuge from hard choices, a comfort zone where the law 
of diminishing returns has a lock hold. It has brought us to the 
brink of annexation and the precipice of PA financial collapse. 
It is not a question of trying harder, of resuming negotiations. 
More of the same guarantees further deterioration, it is a failure 
of learning, politics, and imagination. 
Much ink has been spilled over the years on the imminent 
death of the Oslo Accords and the MEPP. Yet, the PLO/PA 
(Palestine Liberation Organisation/Palestinian Authority) 
has been incapable of shifting strategy, trapped in being the 
collaborator in its own domination. 
Western powers’ support for the “Development for Peace” 
agenda has contributed to paving the way to the economy of 
permanent occupation we are in today, where the Palestinian 
question is transformed from a political one into a humanitarian 
and security issue to be managed.57 International development 
institutions have continued supporting a system that inflates 
limited Palestinian self-rule and that increasingly fails to 
acknowledge the occupation and settler-colonialism as the primary 
context of their intervention and as the main factors driving 
Palestinian vulnerability.58 As the sociologist Sbeih Sbeih has been 
57 Read notably Twafic Hadad’s work: Palestine Ltd.: Neoliberalism and Nationalism 
in the Occupied Territory, London, I.B. Tauris and Center for Palestine Studies, 
London Middle East Institute, 2016.
58 Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories An Oral and Document Analysis of  Western Donor perceptions of  
development and peacebuilding in their Palestinian aid programming, Academia, 
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pointing out for years, this discourse “presents development in the 
Occupied Territories, just like in other countries, as a ‘universal’ 
humanitarian project, based on a set of technical measures, 
including economic, and implicitly located “outside the political 
debate”. Such a neoliberal representation of the social world 
conceives the political sphere as serving the market economy. As 
a result, the role of technocrats is idealised unlike any national 
political reading or claim to struggle for liberation”.59
From the European side, a series of factors have worried 
Brussels60 and explain why the EU and liberal European countries 
keep mouthing the same refrain, putting human rights and 
people’s aspirations as lower priorities than short-term “security” 
and “stability” in the MENA region, including Palestine: the 
failures of EU policies to support popular aspirations following 
the 2011 “Arab Spring” and the ensuing crises; the alignment 
with American policies post 9/11, particularly the “war on 
terror” and how this affects its relations with Hamas-ruled 
Gaza; and the repercussions of regional turmoil inside the EU, 
such as the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers, and terrorist 
attacks. These factors also contributed to the rise of the populist 
nationalist right and far-right, which is largely antagonistic to 
Palestinians, further dividing EU foreign policymaking and 
blocking any effort to hold Israel accountable. 
A process based on false premises  
that are increasing diplomatic cognitive dissonance
All fundamental considerations which must underpin a just 
and peaceful future – freedom, equal rights and justice – have 
been subordinate to the advancement of a “process” that has 
been based on inherently flawed assumptions.
J. Wildeman, “Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories”, 2018. 
59 Collective development projects in Palestine: Propagation of  the neoliberal 
vulgate and normalisation of  domination, Academia.
60 J. Dempsey, Judy Asks: Is the EU Putting Stabilization Before Human Rights?, Judy 
Dampsey’sStrategic Europe, Carnegie Europe, 10 January 2018.
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First, the Oslo narrative has mainstreamed the ideas that 
this is a “conflict” between two parties on equal footing, two 
competing national narratives that can reach compromise 
through negotiations. Second, that Israel is in “good faith” 
in striving towards a two-state solution and that the two-
state solution is the “only solution agreed by both parties”. 
On the first assumption, in a political process born out of 
a dire asymmetry of power between Israel and the PLO, the 
absence of pressure on Israel to make concessions, the lack of 
conditionalities on its diplomatic relations, and impunity for 
its colonial enterprise renders any perspective of meaningful 
negotiations chimeric. This bitter conclusion was already 
expressed almost 10 years ago by a Palestinian negotiator who 
leaked negotiation papers in the latest round of negotiations 
calling them “a deceptive farce, whereby biased terms were 
unilaterally imposed by Israel and systematically endorsed by 
the U.S. and EU capitals”.61
Regarding the second assumption, there isn’t in fact any 
written document where Israel ever recognised the right of 
Palestinians to self-determination, or to a state of their own. In 
the Oslo Agreements,62 the PLO recognised Israel while Israel 
only recognised the PLO as the “legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people”. 
From the Allon Plan (1967), Drobles Plan (1978)63 to Yitzhak 
Rabin, who is still commonly seen as the leader who could have 
made it happen, Israeli leaders have long envisaged a limited 
Palestinian autonomy and not a two-state solution based on 
the 4 June 1967 borders64 that would enable an independent 
61 Z. Clot, “Palestine Papers: Why I blew the whistle”, Al Jazeera, 14 May 2011.
62 Yasser Arafat Foundation, PLO-Israel mutual Recognition – Israel letter (1993), 9 
September 1993.
63 Y. Shaul, “Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan Isn’t New. It Plagiarized a 40-Year-
Old Israeli Initiative”, Foreign Policy, 11 February 2020.
64 A. Iraqi, “The myth of  Rabin the peacemaker”, +972Magazine, 27 September 
2020.
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Palestinian sovereign state. Rabin’s last speech to the Knesset65 
to ratify the Oslo II agreement is clear in that regard, envisioning 
“less than a state” for Palestinians, consolidating settlements 
and annexing Jerusalem. 
Israeli leaders have continuously paid lip service to the two-
state solution and peace process for the sake of diplomacy, 
while successive plans and decisions have belied them. For that, 
they have repeatedly used a tactic of “crying wolf”, announcing 
policies and plans that put the international community on 
high alert, prompting warnings and condemnations, only so 
Israel can then announce the freezing of such plans, appearing 
to make concessions and “preserving the status quo” while 
continuing to create facts on the grounds and entrench an 
apartheid reality at no cost. This was the case with the signing 
of the Oslo Accords, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and 
the latest debate on annexation.66 Such a strategy has increased 
successive Israeli governments’ contempt for the international 
community’s involvement and rhetoric. 
Today, European and liberal countries in general are facing 
this cognitive dissonance head on: For them, giving up on 
the current paradigm without a solid and easily-identifiable 
alternative for “conflict resolution” could make room for the 
dangerous paradigm shift of “peace for peace” and normalisation 
of apartheid promoted by Israel and its allies, one where human 
rights and international law are not part of the equation at all. 
On the other hand, they seem afraid of being left out of 
a diplomatic momentum, thus increasing their geopolitical 
irrelevance. The welcoming and positive attitude towards the 
accords, the meeting of Israeli and Emirati Foreign Ministers 
in Berlin67 and the calls to reinstate the EU-Israeli Association 
Council68 are all disturbing signals in this regard. Exiting such 
65 Israel Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, PM Rabin in Knesset- Ratification of  
Interim Agreement, 5 October 1995.
66 H. El-Ad, “Waiting for Annexation”, The American Prospect, 16 July 2020.
67 Federal Foreign Office, A historic meeting in Berlin, 6 October 2020.
68 N. Landau, “With Annexation Suspended, EU States Propose Reinstating 
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a dilemma requires political confrontation that no Western 
country is currently interested in prioritising, while failing to 
do so will continue encouraging further erosion of international 
norms and the rise of ethno-nationalist supremacy. 
The Palestinian Establishment Trapped on All Sides 
The democratic deficit 
The current Palestinian establishment, the Palestinian Authority 
and PLO, in addition to Hamas in Gaza, has continued to 
be dramatically weakened by the Covid-19 crisis and related 
Israeli policies and geopolitical developments. The Palestinian 
national movement and its representatives is more than ever 
divided, corrupt and disconnected from the people. 
The PA is perceived as largely corrupt and repressive;69 
more than through the mismanagement of funds, through the 
inherent neo-patrimonialism of the PA’s structure. Most people 
do not trust the leadership, don’t identify with the existing 
factions (mainly Hamas and Fatah) and would like to see the 
President resign.70 The PA and Hamas in Gaza have never been 
accountable to the Palestinian people, but rather to international 
donors and Israel, and are seen by many Palestinians as 
complicit in perpetuating the current reality.71 The Covid-19 
has further eroded what little public trust remained in the PA 
and Hamas to manage civil affairs in the limited territory they 
control, notably because of the economic consequences and the 
deepening financial crisis.
Israel Association Council After Eight Years”, Haaretz, 28 August 2020.
69 “Neopatrimonialism, Corruption, and the Palestinian Authority: Pathways to 
Real Reform”, Al-Shabaka, 20 December 2018.
70 Latest opinion polls on Public Opinion Poll No. 77, 9-12 September 2020, 
Policy and Survey Research.
71 Ibid.
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The security apparatus in both the West Bank and Gaza has 
built up a record of human rights violations and exacerbated 
endemic corruption – absorbing more of the PA’s budget than 
the education, health, and agriculture sectors combined.72 On 
its end, Hamas in Gaza will have difficulties in extracting itself 
from the international political Islam and Islamism terrorism it 
is associated with, despite taking its distance from the Muslim 
Brotherhood and reiterating that it is a national movement. 
Israel is carefully engineering a fragile equilibrium for the 
current reality of permanent occupation and apartheid to 
remain stable: undermining the PA’s ability to make decisions, 
while still ensuring it remains afloat. On the one hand, Israel 
needs the PA to continue managing the Palestinian people 
under occupation on its behalf, and to pursue a security 
coordination that is fundamental to Israel’s policy of separation. 
For example, the Israeli government has lobbied Washington so 
that funding for the security sector would not be affected by the 
so-called ATCA (Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act) legislation 
in the U.S. that has led to cutting all funds to the Palestinian 
Authority.73 On the other hand, it is continuously weakening 
and discrediting the PA by maintaining it under strict control, 
opening and closing the tap as political leverage, notably 
through withholding tax transfers74 or electricity.75
In the current international context, Hamas and Fatah have 
no choice but to work more seriously on unity and to show they 
are willing to hold elections. The two factions monopolising 
power met and agreed in September 2020 on a series of 
steps towards elections in the next six months.76 There is still 
72 F. Quran and T. Mustafa “Palestine and COVID-19: Lessons for Leadership 
During Times of  Crisis”, Al-Shabaka, 10 September 2020.
73 B. Ravid, “Israel asks U.S. to amend law that would cut aid to Palestinian 
security forces”, Axios, 23 January 2017.
74 “Israel to withhold millions of  dollars in Palestinian funds”, Al Jazeera, 17 
February 2019.
75 “Israeli electric company ends power cuts to West Bank after Palestinians pay 
debt”, Reuters, 22 February 2020.
76 “Fatah, Hamas say deal reached on Palestinian elections”, Al Jazeera, 24 
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widespread scepticism about whether these will effectively 
materialise. More importantly, particularly in an institutional 
context where power is enacted by presidential decrees, PA 
or PLO elections alone, would not renew the democratic 
process, but would instead “prop up a system that does not 
allow for democratic space and that does not seek to produce a 
democratic and representative leadership”.77
The absence of international strategy 
of the PLO and Hamas
Today the PLO/PA establishment (including Hamas) is trapped 
in the Oslo Paradigm and does not have an international 
strategy anymore. By strengthening the PA against the PLO 
through state-building, the PA has been wrongly perceived – 
and perceives itself – as a sovereign State on a level playing field 
with other nation-states. But the PA lacks all of the attributes 
of a state necessary to engage in realpolitik, and is effectively a 
colonised administration: no borders, no army, no resources, 
no leverage and no incentives to offer. 
The PA has notably been clinging to the League of Arab States, 
and a long-eroded Arab position, and has reacted to the latest 
accords – a logical development of existing informal relations – 
as if it had been “stabbed in the back”.78 Palestinian leaders took 
old alliances for granted, and Mahmoud Abbas never invested 
in building the strategic relations that Yasser Arafat built with 
the help of a handful of advisors. In desperate attempts to find 
allies, and applying the realpolitik logic of neo-authoritarian 
state rivalry, both Fatah and Hamas pursued rapprochement 
with Erdogan’s Turkey and Qatar, while also making appeals to 
Vladimir Putin, but without much to offer in that power game 
except being tokenised by these major countries. 
September 2020.
77 Y. Hawari, “Democracy in the West Bank and Gaza: More than Elections”, 
Al-Shabaka, 19 February 2020.
78 “At the leadership meeting, President Abbas says Palestinian issue is not only 
about annexation”, Palestine News & Info Agency, 18 August 2020.
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It has also been using the UN as an end and not a mean, but 
with U.S. veto power at the Security Council this strategy has 
had a positive but limited impact. Illustrating how low the bar 
has been set, the UN envoy for the Middle East Peace process 
has recently stated  that he is not even trying to hold Israel 
accountable, but simply mitigating the effects of the Israeli-
dominated reality on the ground, including by giving up on 
asking Israel to remove the blockade and instead limit itself to 
avoiding escalations.79   
The cognitive dissonance between this reality and the rhetoric 
by the international community and Palestinian leadership to 
resume negotiations and save the two-state solution has only 
been made louder by the consequences of the pandemic. 
The Israeli Government and Society, 
Always Further to the Right 
Not surprisingly, and given the political parties and leaders 
Israeli Jews vote for, political trends within Israeli society point 
to a society drifting further towards ethno-nationalist views80 
that mirror the paradigms offered by Netanyahu vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians. The near-absence of violence from the Palestinian 
side and policies of spatial separation described above has 
made the status quo comfortable for Israelis, who don’t have to 
acknowledge the structural racism. 
The settler movement and the religious nationalist 
movements, once marginal actors, have taken centre stage in 
Israeli politics and dominate them together with their powerful 
allies in Washington, starting with Jared Kushner and David 
Friedman. 
79 T. Lazaroff, “Mladenov: UN focus now on avoiding war, less on Israeli-
Palestinian talks”, The Jerusalem Post, 24 September 2020.
80 D. Scheindlin, “The right keeps winning in Israel because Israelis are right 
wing”, +972Magazine, 19 November 2018.
After the Storm98
In a recent poll, half of Israelis supported annexation of the 
West Bank, while the other half saw annexation as a risk to 
Israel’s diplomacy and relations, as well as a drift towards a 
“one-state solution” narrative,81 a risk not worth taking given 
the comfortable position of the status quo for the Israelis. It was 
not centred at all on Palestinians, their rights and the apartheid 
reality. One example was the rhetoric used by the “Commander 
for Israel” to oppose annexation.82 
The state of Israel has been founded on denying Palestinians 
their national rights, from slogans like “land without a people for 
a people without a land” to famous statements that hit a nerve, 
such as former Prime Minister Golda Meir’s “there is no such 
thing as Palestinians”. Israel has worked towards creating and 
maintaining a Jewish majority in the territory it controls with 
the “demographic equation” at the heart of Israel’s policies.83 
Through the years, Israel has carefully avoided putting an end 
to the conflict between giving up control over the land or losing 
a Jewish demographic majority; the inevitable alternative has 
been the entrenching of an apartheid regime. 
The international developments described above also fortify 
Israel long-held colonial doctrine where “peace” is understood 
as breaking the ability of Palestinians to resist Israel’s military 
domination, following the “iron wall” doctrine laid out by the 
Zionist Ze’ev Jabotinsky as far back as 1923.84
Meanwhile, the so-called “peace camp” that had engaged 
in active dialogue with Palestinians in the 1990s to advance 
the idea of two separate states has slowly disappeared. The 
Labour party barely has any seats in the Knesset and cannot be 
considered “left-wing” anymore. Its leadership has signed off on 
81 Jewish philosophy place, Annexation Polls (Dahlia Scheindlin), 4 July 2020.
82 H. El-Ad, “What’s the Real Purpose of  Israel’s Annexation Plan?”, Haaretz, 
16 May 2020.
83 Y Shaul, “Annexation aims to cut Palestinians out of  Israel’s demographic 
equation”, +972Magazine, 28 July 2020.
84 The Iron Wall, Original in Russian, Razsviet, 4.11.1923, Colonisation of  
Palestine, Agreement with Arabs Impossible at present, Zionism Must Go 
Forward.
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West Bank annexation. The few remaining voices advocating 
for two-states are represented within the not-less shrinking and 
divided party Meretz. 
Netanyahu is facing opposition, with continuous 
demonstrations over the last several  months, from left-leaning 
groups to settlers who are taking to the streets to protest his 
policies, his corruption and mismanagement of the Covid-19 
pandemic that has strangled the country’s economy.85 However, 
these demonstrations are not questioning the current regime of 
control over millions of Palestinians, and not many Palestinian 
citizens of Israel are engaged. Should Netanyahu be compelled 
to resign – although unlikely – he would be replaced by a 
coalition even further to the right, with a “centre” that has 
diverging views on some social and family topics concerning 
Jewish Israelis but with very similar views with regards to 
Palestinians. 
A New Era for a Palestinian Strategy 
Towards Self-Determination 
Trends for revamping a national movement 
Against the backdrop of the international and regional trends 
described above, a new wave of people-led social movements is 
rising around the world, framed around the values underpinning 
freedom, justice and equality and rejecting the normalisation of 
violence and dispossession. 
Whether indigenous people struggle for justice and 
recognition, or fight for democracy and against authoritarianism, 
people in Sudan, Algeria, Hong Kong, Kashmir, Belarus and the 
U.S. are proposing radical change and are increasingly realising 
the convergence of their struggles.  
85 “Hundreds of  anti-Netanyahu protesters march in Tel Aviv despite virus 
lockdown”,The Times of  Israel, 9 October 2020.
After the Storm100
There is widespread consensus in Palestinian society on the 
urgent need to completely revamp the national movement and, 
like these other movements around the world, to centre it around 
a value-based discourse focusing on justice, dignity and equal 
rights. Palestinian resistance and mobilisation efforts outside 
of the PLO-PA realm (e.g. the BDS – Boycott, Divestment, 
Sanctions – movement) reflect the desire of younger Palestinian 
generations to unapologetically re-appropriate their identity 
and narrative, free from the paradigms imposed by Israel and 
the international community of nation-states and the false 
equivalences they have created.  
Accepting the idea of partition – behind UN resolution 181 
of 1947 – and centring liberation around statehood, has driven 
political rhetoric towards two competing national narratives 
instead of ending the colonial structures of power. Although the 
idea of a separate Palestinian nation-state still seems the most 
attainable solution for many given that “statehood has been the 
dominant prism through which liberation is imagined”,86 1948 
remains the central node that unites all Palestinian experiences 
in one way or another and that has been at the heart of 
Palestinian collective political imagination.  This explains the 
growing attention towards the idea of a single democratic bi-
national state as a natural option for ending apartheid. The idea 
of one democratic state is not new and has been understood 
quite differently since the early XX century by Zionists, Israelis 
and Palestinians.87 A statehood-centric solution still bears the 
risk of being abused and redefined if it is not based on the 
necessary values of equal collective and individual rights – just 
like Trump has been trying to re-define the two-state solution 
as one accommodating apartheid. 
However, a new direction can only be achieved with efficient 
consensus-building and renewed political agency and space, 
which is not being captured by the PLO/PA and main factions. 
86 Y. Hawari, “Beyond Failed Frameworks: A Re-Imagined Collective Future”, 
Al-Shabaka, 23 July 2020.
87 PhD Itxaso Dominguez.
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Calls to reclaim the PLO88 are multiplying, particularly from 
Palestinians in exile89 who have been completely disfranchised 
from the national project by the Oslo Accords. The role of 
the Palestinians in exile (the diaspora), particularly younger 
generations, is very important in reclaiming the political 
imagination of Palestinians as a whole.  
In the U.S., the Palestinian rights movement, increasingly 
led by Palestinian-Americans, has had a growing ability to 
influence the debate  over U.S.-Israel relations. While the 
movement cannot yet claim a significant weight in the power 
balance, it has been able to start breaking the long bipartisan 
consensus on Israel.90
The Covid-19 crisis has also shown that leadership can still 
emerge within Palestine from local communities organising 
when people can’t rely on the PA. Palestinian capacity for 
steadfastness (sumood in Arabic) is alive, despite the depletion 
of resources and fragmentation as a result of the Israeli regime.91 
This was the case for example in East Jerusalem, which while 
neglected by the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem and where 
the PA is not allowed to intervene,92 has been able to build 
nostalgia of the late 1980’s, when the Palestinian political 
fabric successfully experienced grassroots social organising, 
strengthening the legitimacy to the PLO.93
Yet such needed movements and initiatives still lack 
organisation and convergence. Palestinians are fragmented and 
need to acquire political agency and a conducive political space. 
88 N. Ali, M. Fatafta, D. El Kurd, F. Quran, and B. Shobaki, “Reclaiming The 
PLO, Re-Engaging Youth”, Al-Shabaka, 13 August 2020.
89 K. Hawwash, “Why we need elections to the Palestinian National Council”, 
Middle East Eye, 23 June 2020.
90 “As AOC cancels Rabin event, Palestine movement finds new clout in 
Washington”, +972Magazine, 26 September 2020.
91 F. Quran and T. Mustafa, “Palestine and COVID-19: Lessons for Leadership 
During Times of  Crisis”, Al-Shabaka, 10 September 2020.
92 D. Kuttab, “Jerusalem alliance fills gap in coronavirus awareness”, Al-Monitor, 
18 March 2020.
93 L. Tabar, People’s Power: Lessons from the First Intifada, Center for Development 
Studies and Birzeit University, April 2013.
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Palestinians have grown suspicious of all political projects, 
which are often perceived as co-opted by Israel of Western 
countries, and have difficulties in trusting the idea of political 
representation, in light of the strategic failures of the past 
century and the toxic political culture entrenched by the Oslo 
accords. The heightening of the PA’s neo-authoritarian features 
and the neo-liberal Oslo infrastructure described above remain 
important obstacles to enabling political renewal. Hence the 
urgency to engage differently. 
Jewish-Palestinian co-resistance against the system  
A noteworthy evolution comes from the growing rallying of 
Jewish groups in co-resisting oppression alongside Palestinians, 
by centring Palestinian freedom as the core to a brighter 
future for both peoples.  Such co-resistance is also based on 
values and rights before political framings of separation and 
“peacebuilding”. They are interacting, yet taking a different 
approach and calling for more radical change than the groups 
more traditionally associated with “peace” inherited from Oslo, 
which are defending “people-to-people” programmes and an 
agenda confined within the Oslo-MEPP paradigm. 
In Israel, human rights organisations like B’Tselem, Gisha, 
Breaking the Silence and a few others have been at the forefront 
of this evolution, but remain marginal in the political landscape. 
They are often considered “traitors” within Israeli society – and 
indeed the government has helped propagate this smear, while 
passing laws to limit their room to manoeuvre.94 Even more 
significant is the political evolution of the Jewish diaspora in 
the United States, which has been openly questioning Israel’s 
policies and reframing a solution beyond the Oslo Paradigm, 
all in a context of growing attacks by anti-human rights pro-
Israel lobby groups against certain Democratic candidates.95 
94 A. Jamal, The Rise of  “Bad Civil Society” in Israel, SWP Comment, SWP German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, January 2018.
95 D. Marans, “Israel Hawks Are Spending Big To Unseat Minnesota Rep. Ilhan 
Palestine and Israel in the Post-Covid World 103
This is the case of groups such as Jewish Voices for Peace and 
If Not Now. In this regard, it is worth noting that in the lead-
up to the U.S. presidential election polls show that a majority 
of Israelis would prefer a Trump presidency96 while American 
Jewish citizens are more likely to support Biden.97
The other related significant trend in Israeli politics is the 
organising of Palestinian citizens of Israel who have won 
between 13 to 15 seats at the Knesset in recent elections. 
The parties forming the “Joint List” unapologetically defend 
Palestinian-Arab national rights within the state of Israel and 
are now the only ones in the Knesset advocating for the idea 
of a fully democratic state with equal rights within the current 
borders of Israel. These political actors – including Ayman Odeh 
and Ahmad Tibi – have regular contacts and interactions with 
Palestinians in the West Bank and will be a growing force in 
redefining the Palestinian polity beyond the currently imposed 
institutional frameworks. 
Conclusion - The Way Forward
What we see taking place in the territory between the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River is a microcosm of 
international trends where structural violence is trivialised, the 
smearing and targeting journalists or human rights defenders is 
accelerating, where social repression at home, commoditisation 
of peoples’ data and ethno-nationalist policies are justified in 
the name of security and peace. 
In the world order, currently advanced by the U.S., Israel 
and their neo-authoritarian allies, international law and 
human rights are no longer the reference points for the rules of 
Omar”, HuffPost, 21July 2020.
96 C. Levine, “Majority of  Israelis prefer Donald Trump over Joe Biden – poll”, 
The Jerusalem Post, 14 October 2020.
97 S.Chemla, “70% of  Jewish Americans support Joe Biden - new poll”, The 
Jerusalem Post, 14 October 2020.
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engagement and the Palestinian cause is intentionally relegated 
to a marginal political agenda.
The one-state reality of an apartheid regime in the territory 
between the Mediterranean sea and the Jordan river will be 
entrenched, and will continue to increase the interdependence 
of both Israelis and Palestinians in spaces marked by structural 
and institutionalised discrimination and domination. Instead 
of further separating Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians, it is 
increasing their interdependence, creating a fault line where 
the only two options are supporting apartheid or ending it. 
A growing number of younger Palestinians already realise the 
need to build a new national project based on ending settler 
colonialism and apartheid rather than focusing on statehood to 
achieve self-determination. 
The resurgence of anti-racist social justice movements and 
indigenous people’s struggles around the world is unnerving 
many of the countries headed by authoritarian and neo-
authoritarians leaders. Such movements create opportunities to 
disrupt domestic repression, while new forms of solidarity and 
political influence emerge from people’s collectives. 
The international community has been anticipating tipping 
points in a wait-and-see approach as if it were Waiting for Godot: 
the next peace conference, a settlement freeze, the nuclear deal 
with Iran, the announcement of Trump’s “deal of the Century”, 
the next Israeli elections, the halt of de jure annexation… None 
of these moments have shifted Israel’s trajectory. It is likely that 
a Biden administration in the U.S. will not significantly reverse 
the course of events, and at best abandon some of the worst 
Trump’s policies. 
For European and democratic states around the world who 
hold significant leverage – be it financial or diplomatic – in Israel-
Palestine, there is an urgent need to end the cognitive dissonance 
between the empty rhetoric of the Oslo-configured MEPP – 
including its peace-building and state-building frameworks – 
and the dire reality of injustice and dispossession on the ground. 
Such dissonance has only encouraged cost-free colonisation. 
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Such a shift requires diplomatic courage to introduce 
confrontation and enable true accountability; failing to do 
so will lead to effectively normalising violence and apartheid. 
Countries must be open to revisiting the whole contemporary 
idea of partition, by first and foremost centring justice, freedom 
and equal rights for both Israelis and Palestinians as a base for 
supporting any viable political path. 
I want to end with this powerful thought written recently by 
Arundathi Roy: 
As we pass through this portal into another kind of world, we 
will have to ask ourselves what we want to take with us and what 
we will leave behind. We may not always have a choice – but not 
thinking about it will not be an option. And in order to think 
about it, we need an even deeper understanding of the world 
gone by, of the devastation we have caused to our planet and the 
deep injustice between fellow human beings that we have come 
to accept.98 
98 A. Roy, “What Lies Ahead?”, The Paris Review, 15 September 2020.
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